Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy - Re: India posed to require cleartext, cleartext retention, cipher and backdoor mandates
Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 22 September 2015 10:20 UTC
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To: Dan York <york@isoc.org>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>, Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy - Re: India posed to require cleartext, cleartext retention, cipher and backdoor mandates
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On 22/09/15 10:57, Dan York wrote: > There was a significant amount of public outcry yesterday within > India and the latest news is that the government of India is > apparently withdrawing the draft policy: > That was quick. Optimistically, it is good to see common sense breaking out a bit. And that maybe today's widespread use of TLS for very widely used services sort of protects crypto generally by making it more obviously a bad idea to muck with the internals. We here can continue to help improve that last part. A more pessimistic speculation would be this was a proposal some local securocrats [1] had sitting in a filing cabinet ready to be pulled out whenever they figured it was politically opportune. This time, they forgot to sanity-check that the content was still ok today before showing it off. Maybe they picked the wrong moment as well, not sure, but they definitely didn't do the sanity checks. In that case, they'd likely do better next time. It'd be mildly interesting if someone were to analyse the content to estimate when it might originally have been written. Cheers, S. [1] https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/securocrat > http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Government-withdraws-draft-of-encryption-policy/articleshow/49057232.cms > > Prior to that the government agency involved had already issued an > update saying that the draft policy would NOT apply to TLS in web > commerce and social media, messaging, etc. The update document seems > to have been removed, but is captured here by a news site: > > http://www.medianama.com/2015/09/223-india-draft-encryption-policy/ > > Dan > > On Sep 21, 2015, at 1:07 PM, Stephen Farrell > <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie<mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>> wrote: > > > Sheesh, there is so much wrong in that document. And they top it off > by recommending RC4. > > Does anyone know if this is a policy that is likely to be enforced or > one that'd be more honoured in the breach? > > S. > > On 21/09/15 17:45, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote: Obviously, of relevance > to those that will be at the IAB MARNEW workshop this week (although > this isn't in any way specific to radio networks). > > * Everyone (all individuals and businesses) using encryption must > store unencrypted content for 90 days * Government will dictate > algorithms and key sizes * Possibility of a legally mandated > backdoor > > Article from Daily Dot: > http://www.dailydot.com/politics/india-encryption-backdoors-draft-policy/ > > Text of the proposal (comments due 16 Oct.): > https://info.publicintelligence.net/IN-DraftEncryptionPolicy.pdf > > > > _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list > perpass@ietf.org<mailto:perpass@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass > > -- Dan York Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society > york@isoc.org<mailto:york@isoc.org> +1-802-735-1624 Jabber: > york@jabber.isoc.org<mailto:york@jabber.isoc.org> Skype: danyork > http://twitter.com/danyork > > http://www.internetsociety.org/<http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/> > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list > perpass@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass >
- [perpass] India posed to require cleartext, clear… Joseph Lorenzo Hall
- Re: [perpass] India posed to require cleartext, c… Stephen Farrell
- [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy - Re:… Dan York
- Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy -… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy -… Joseph Lorenzo Hall
- Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy -… Brian Trammell
- Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy -… Hugo Maxwell Connery
- Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy -… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy -… Michael Richardson
- Re: [perpass] India withdraws encryption policy -… Joseph Lorenzo Hall