Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply)
Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> Fri, 28 February 1997 05:51 UTC
Received: from cnri by ietf.org id aa28692; 28 Feb 97 0:51 EST
Received: from portal.ex.tis.com by CNRI.Reston.VA.US id aa01906;
28 Feb 97 0:51 EST
Received: (from majordom@localhost) by portal.ex.tis.com (8.8.2/8.8.2) id
AAA03521 for ipsec-outgoing; Fri, 28 Feb 1997 00:40:03 -0500 (EST)
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 1997 21:44:29 -0800 (PST)
From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
Message-Id: <199702280544.VAA15002@servo.qualcomm.com>
To: perry@piermont.com
CC: rmonsour@earthlink.net, ipsec@tis.com
In-reply-to: <199702191422.JAA02189@jekyll.piermont.com> (perry@piermont.com)
Subject: Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply)
Sender: owner-ipsec@ex.tis.com
Precedence: bulk
>consumers -- want to conduct transactions over it. With a reasonable >IPSec in place, SSL wouldn't have been necessary. SSL is used every I used to say this too, but not any more. I now believe it's desirable to have multiple, complementary architectural approaches to security. SSL represents a transport layer approach while IPSEC represents the network layer approach. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, and I suspect that each will find their niches. Advantages of transport layer security (e.g., SSL, SSH): 1. Can operate on an end-to-end basis with existing TCP/IP stacks with existing APIs (winsock, BSD sockets, streams, etc). This is a VERY important issue with turnkey object-only systems like Windows 95. 2. More efficient over slow speed links. VJ header compression still works, and various congestion-control schemes that peek at TCP/IP headers (e.g., my TCP ack-dropping scheme) still work. 3. No special problems with fragmentation, path MTU discovery, etc. 4. Compression combined with encryption at this layer is much more effective than compression at the packet layer. Advantages of network layer security (e.g., IPSEC) 1. Can support completely unmodified end systems, though in this case encryption is no longer strictly end-to-end. 2. Particularly suitable for building virtual private networks across untrusted networks. 3. Can support transport protocols other than TCP (e.g., UDP). 4. Hides the transport layer headers from eavesdropping, providing somewhat greater protection against traffic analysis. 5. With AH and replay detection, protects against certain denial-of-service attacks based on swamping (e.g., TCP SYN attacks). I think it likely that IPSEC will find its niche in building virtual private networks, while SSL and SSH (though they may merge) will continue to be used for many end-to-end applications such as web commerce, remote login, file transfer, etc. Phil
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) Bob Monsour
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) EKR
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) Bob Monsour
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) Dennis Glatting
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) Terry L. Davis, Boeing Information & Support Services, Bellevue, WA
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) EKR
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) Rodney Thayer
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) Phil Karn
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) Stephen Kent
- Re: TO COMPRESS OR NOT TO CMPRS (please reply) Phil Karn