Re: [pkix] Validating Certs w/out reliable source of Time

"Dr. Pala" <director@openca.org> Mon, 08 October 2018 15:45 UTC

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To: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Cc: pkampana@cisco.com, IETF PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
References: <f1d0a721-96e4-5d1b-4dd3-7b041e3c4379@openca.org> <47b70e1c4d214e9297e29b9ee1450c59@XCH-ALN-010.cisco.com> <a16d45ac-b48e-6cee-40c1-84b065df2d4c@openca.org> <CA+cU71mPq0qKWQ7XQRfZOfPZQ+NWuW6PTy+948LCqoaw_HiSuA@mail.gmail.com>
From: "Dr. Pala" <director@openca.org>
Organization: OpenCA Labs
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Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2018 09:45:22 -0600
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Validating Certs w/out reliable source of Time
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Hi Tom,


On 10/8/18 9:00 AM, Tom Ritter wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Oct 2018 at 14:13, Dr. Pala <director@openca.org 
> <mailto:director@openca.org>> wrote:
>
>     Hi Panos, all,
>
>     [...]
>
>
> If you use OCSP in a challenge-response mode with nonces - you could 
> get this within established TLS/PKIX standards. Although OCSP 
> challenge/response (as opposed to stapling) is falling out favor; and 
> OCSP nonces stopped being used over a decade ago. But I don't think 
> the code is removed from tools; just uncommonly used.
>
> Caveats being; of course, the uptime of your time/OCSP server; 
> difficulty of rotating that server's certificate, what to do when you 
> don't get a response....

For our specific case, we considered using the OCSP responses since our 
servers do support NONCEs and do not have ridiculously long 
validity/caching period (as it seems current practices from many CAs), 
however that might not be a good path for a generic solution (beacuse of 
current practices). I am also considering other protocols (e.g., SCVP) 
and cross-protocols options (e.g., DNS entries/extensions, etc.) - 
however the constraints on network access might make these approaches 
also difficult...

Thanks again,

Cheers,

-- 
Best Regards,
Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D.
OpenCA Labs Director
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