Re: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (7164)

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Sat, 15 October 2022 02:17 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2022 22:17:08 -0400
Cc: David Cooper <david.cooper@nist.gov>, Stefan Santesson <sts@aaa-sec.com>, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Tim Polk <wpolk@nist.gov>, "Roman D. Danyliw" <rdd@cert.org>, Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>, IETF PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (7164)
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Upon further reflection,  I think the should be rejected.

   DistributionPoint ::= SEQUENCE {
        distributionPoint       [0]     DistributionPointName OPTIONAL,
        reasons                 [1]     ReasonFlags OPTIONAL,
        cRLIssuer               [2]     GeneralNames OPTIONAL }

The distributionPoint says where to get the CRL.

The reasons define the scope.

The cRLIssuer identifies the entity that signs and issues the CRL.

So, I believe the original text is correct.

Russ


> On Oct 14, 2022, at 4:03 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> 
> I see your point, but I think we should keep "if any"
> 
> Russ
> 
> 
>> On Oct 14, 2022, at 3:39 PM, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>> 
>> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5280,
>> "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile".
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> You may review the report below and at:
>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7164
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> Type: Technical
>> Reported by: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>
>> 
>> Section: 5.2.5
>> 
>> Original Text
>> -------------
>>  If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
>>  entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
>>  issuer, if any, within the scope of the CRL.
>> 
>> Corrected Text
>> --------------
>>  If the distributionPoint field is absent, the CRL MUST contain
>>  entries for all revoked unexpired certificates issued by the CRL
>>  issuer.
>> 
>> Notes
>> -----
>> The removed phrase does not appear in the original text that this requirement is derived from, ITU-T Rec. X.509 (08/2005) Section 8.6.2.2: "If the issuing distribution point field, the AA issuing distribution point field, and the CRL scope field are all absent, the CRL shall contain entries for all revoked unexpired public-key certificates issued by the CRL issuer."
>> 
>> The removed phrase does not serve to create a stricter requirement; rather it creates a looser requirement which allows a CRL which does contain entries for all revoked unexpired certificates *within its scope* to not include the distributionPoint field. Given that the distributionPoint field serves an important security purpose in preventing substitution attacks, it is unlikely that this loosening was the intent of the original authors.
>> 
>> Instructions:
>> -------------
>> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
>> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> RFC5280 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-11)
>> --------------------------------------
>> Title               : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
>> Publication Date    : May 2008
>> Author(s)           : D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk
>> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>> Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
>> Area                : Security
>> Stream              : IETF
>> Verifying Party     : IESG
>