Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs
"Dr. Pala" <madwolf@openca.org> Mon, 17 July 2017 15:16 UTC
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From: "Dr. Pala" <madwolf@openca.org>
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Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 17:16:34 +0200
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs
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Hi Eric, thanks, however this does not solve the issue I am trying to address - it would be great if we would have it scoped. For example (not aiming at correctness here.. :D): privateKeyUsageTypes ::= CHOICE { anyPurpose, certificateSigning, ... } scopedPrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE { scope privateKeyUsageTypes, notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } privateKeyUsageRestrictions ::= SET OF scopedPrivateKeyUsagePeriod Of course, this is just an example :-D Cheers, Max On 7/17/17 5:04 PM, Erik Andersen wrote: > > Hi Massimiliano, > > What about the private key usage period extension. It was clarified in > the latest edition of X.509: > > > 9.2.2.5 Private key usage period extension > > This extension indicates the period of use of the private key > corresponding to the certified public key. It is applicable only for > private key used for creating digital signatures. This extension is > defined as follows: > > privateKeyUsagePeriod EXTENSION ::= { > > SYNTAX PrivateKeyUsagePeriod > > IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod } > > PrivateKeyUsagePeriod ::= SEQUENCE { > > notBefore [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, > > notAfter [1] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, > > ... } > > (WITH COMPONENTS {..., notBefore PRESENT } | > > WITH COMPONENTS {..., notAfter PRESENT } ) > > The notBefore component indicates the earliest date and time at which > the private key may be used for signing. If the notBefore component is > not present, then no information is provided as to when the period of > valid use of the private key commences beyond that specified in the > validity component of the public-key certificate. The notAfter > component indicates the latest date and time at which the private key > may be used for signing. If the notAfter component is not present then > no information is provided as to when the period of valid use of the > private key concludes beyond that specified in the validity component > of the public-key certificate. > > This extension shall always be flagged as non-critical. > > NOTE 1 – The period of valid use of the private key may be different > from the certified validity of the public key as indicated by the > public-key certificate validity period. The usage period for the > private key used for signing is typically shorter than that for the > public key used for verifying the signature. > > NOTE 2 – The period of use of the private key corresponding to a > public key can only be enforced if both the private key and the > corresponding public-key certificate are placed in a tamper-resistant > hardware module that contains a reliable clock synchronized with UTC. > When this is not the case, a signer may avoid using a signing private > key up to the very end of the validity period of the public-key > certificate. This is one possible use of this extension. > > NOTE 3 – In general, this Specification does not associate any > semantic with this extension. Any particular use of this extension > will have to specify the semantic associated with that usage. > > *Fra:*pkix [mailto:pkix-bounces@ietf.org] *På vegne af *Dr. Pala > *Sendt:* 17 July 2017 16:20 > *Til:* pkix@ietf.org > *Emne:* [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs > > Hi PKIX, > > I have a small question for the list regarding long-lived CA > certificates. Especially in the context of device certificates, we > often see the use of extra long-lived certificates for Root and Sub > CAs (e.g., 35+ years) combined with limited key sizes (e.g., p256). > > Until we have a supported mechanism for reprovisioning devices (...), > one possible solution for limiting the exposure of the private key > would be to have a scoped certificate issuance period. > > What I am thinking about would be adding an extension that says: "This > CA can issue certificates from up to 5 years from the validFrom, after > this, just use it to provide revocation information". This might > provide some protection in case the CA key is compromised after the > initial 5 years of validity (e.g., certificates issued after that date > shall be rejected). > > Does such extension exists today ? If not, could this be some work for > LAMPS/SPASM WG ? > > Cheers, > Max > > -- > > Best Regards, > > Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D. > OpenCA Labs Director > > OpenCA Logo > > > > _______________________________________________ > pkix mailing list > pkix@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
- [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Rob Stradling
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Erik Andersen
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Erik Andersen
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Carl Wallace
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Carl Wallace
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Peter Gutmann
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Erik Andersen
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs David A. Cooper
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Peter Gutmann
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs David A. Cooper
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Peter Gutmann
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Erik Andersen
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs swilson
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Anders Rundgren
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Denis
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Carl Wallace
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs EG Giessmann
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
- Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs Dr. Pala
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