RE: Logotypes in certificates

Michael Zolotarev <michael.zolotarev@baltimore.com> Wed, 21 March 2001 17:54 UTC

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From: Michael Zolotarev <michael.zolotarev@baltimore.com>
To: 'Ambarish Malpani' <ambarish@valicert.com>, 'Stephen Kent' <kent@bbn.com>, Dean Povey <povey@dstc.qut.edu.au>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Logotypes in certificates
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2001 04:51:46 +1100
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Though I don't favor including logotype or reference to a logotype to a
cert, considering it as a pure marketing trick (sorry, Stefan :), but my
realisation was that a logotype is by no means related to the establishment
of trust. It is 100% meant for a human eye only, and verification algorithm
should simply ignore it, as it ingores any other proprietory extentions. If
the verification comes up with an answer 'not validated', and the software
prompts a user saying 'couldn't validate', and the user still makes a
decision to trust the cert, it is an application's problem, which already
exists now, and logotypes add no extra pitch to it.

As an extreme, if a CA considers logotypes to be anyhow harmful, it simply
won't have a logotype in its own cert, and refuse certification of
logotypes.

Michael
-----Original Message-----
From: Ambarish Malpani [mailto:ambarish@valicert.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2001 4:07 AM
To: 'Stephen Kent'; Dean Povey
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
Subject: RE: Logotypes in certificates



Steve,
    This is the same argument as a CA issuing a cert to a
subordinate, who issues incorrect certificates with it - e.g.
issues a certificate for the domain www.amazon.com to say BN.

Either a CA controls/audits subordinate CAs, or has enough
reason to trust them, or the value of that hierarchy is
pretty useless.

I don't think logos in certificates affect this either way.

Regards,
Ambarish

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambarish Malpani
Architect                                                650.567.5457
ValiCert, Inc.                                  ambarish@valicert.com
339 N. Bernardo Ave.                          http://www.valicert.com
Mountain View, CA 94043


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stephen Kent [mailto:kent@bbn.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2001 8:57 PM
> To: Dean Povey
> Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
> Subject: Re: Logotypes in certificates
> 
> 
> Dean and Stefan,
> 
> As a security kinda' guy, I always approach this from the "what will 
> the bad giy do" perspective.  From that perspective, I worry that a 
> TTP CA will cerfity company X, putting the company X logo in the 
> cert. Then company X will issue a cert to a subordinate CA, and put 
> in that cert an inappropriate logo. It is not realistic for an app to 
> display a chain of logos, and expect a user to pay attention, any 
> more that if one displayed a chain of DNs.  I still maintain that we 
> can agree on what would be a reasonable set of circumstances in which 
> the logo extension would be useful and safe, but I don't see a 
> technical means of enforcing these circumstances without changes to 
> the path validation algorithm. I am open to suggestions that provide 
> the necessary controls and don't have this unfortunate side effect, 
> but I have yet to see an example of such.
> 
> Steve
> 


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