Re: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (5802)

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Tue, 06 August 2019 16:15 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
In-Reply-To: <20190806155608.27C2CB82482@rfc-editor.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2019 12:15:44 -0400
Cc: "Roman D. Danyliw" <rdd@cert.org>, Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, IETF PKIX <pkix@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (5802)
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At the time that these values were assigned, TLS was primarily a protocol for WWW security.  It has since been used in may other environments.  I do not see how a change to the comment in the ASN.1 definition will make any real difference, but I do not really have an objection.

I suggest that this be marked as "Hold for Document Update"

Russ


> On Aug 6, 2019, at 11:56 AM, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>; wrote:
> 
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5280,
> "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5802
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>;
> 
> Section: 4.2.1.12
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
>  id-kp-serverAuth             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
>  -- TLS WWW server authentication
>  -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature,
>  -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement
> 
>  id-kp-clientAuth             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 }
>  -- TLS WWW client authentication
>  -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature
>  -- and/or keyAgreement
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
>  id-kp-serverAuth             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
>  -- TLS server authentication
>  -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature,
>  -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement
> 
>  id-kp-clientAuth             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 }
>  -- TLS client authentication
>  -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature
>  -- and/or keyAgreement
> 
> Notes
> -----
> The proposed change removes the WWW part of the description. In practice these object identifiers are used for server and client applications, but not necessarily web applications. In particular:
> - openssl verification considers them unconditionally even if the server is not a web server or the client a web client
> - There is no object identifier that can be used for protocols like SMTP, IMAP, POP3, LDAP, radius, ...; in practice all these protocols are deployed with the identifiers for WWW
> - Standards like common criteria assume that these object identifiers are for generic server and clients [0].
> 
> [0]. https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/-442-/#FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC5280 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-11)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
> Publication Date    : May 2008
> Author(s)           : D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509)
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG