Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06

[Stefan Santesson <[e-mail]>]

1-3 = issued
4-6 =not issued

Given Peter Rybar's last comment, I'm leaning to my original suggestion to
allow "unknown".

We agree that this is a poor security measure. If the worlds largest PKI
(web pki) decides to forbid the "good" response in situations where the
responder knows that it revives a request for a fraudulent certificate, then
I want to allow them that possibility.

The alternative is to force them to break OCSP.

I could live with a wording saying that a responder MAY respond "unknown" to
a request for a known fraudulent (or not never issued) cert if the responder
possess such knowledge of course..
Note that this does not have to mean that the CA is broken, is may also be
due to an error in the request from the client.

/Stefan


From:  Piyush Jain <[e-mail]>
Date:  Monday, October 22, 2012 5:32 PM
To:  Stefan Santesson <[e-mail]>, 'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>,
'Carl Wallace' <[e-mail]>, 'Simon Tardell'
<[e-mail]>
Cc:  'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>, <[e-mail]>
Subject:  RE: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06

> I¹m sorry but definition of not issued is still unclear to me if you say that
> that a certificate can be cryptographically bound to the CA and still
> not-issued.
> The ambiguity is introduced because now I can do everything that 5280 asks me
> to validate a certificate and still cannot be sure if the certificate was ever
> issued.
>  
> Here are the scenarios where meaning of not issued is unclear to me.
> 1)      A genuine certificate issued by the CA, present in the CA database
> 
> 2)      A genuine certificate issued by the CA, removed from the CA database
> by the CA
> 
> 3)      A genuine certificate issued by the CA, removed from the CA database
> by an attacker
> 
> 4)      A fraudulent certificate issued by an attacker, present in the CA
> database
> 
> 5)      A fraudulent certificate issued by an attacker, removed from the CA
> database
> 
> 6)      A fraudulent certificate containing an AIA pointing to a fraudulent
> OCSP responder (also cryptographically bound to the CA), issued by an
> attacker, removed from the CA database.
> 
>  
> If the CA can differentiate among these cases, it can mark the fraudulent
> certificates as revoked and we won¹t need an overloaded definition of
> not-issued. Also not that if an attacker can carry out Œ4¹ it can also carry
> out Œ5¹ and Œ6¹
>  
> The people who are convinced that this is the way to go have not addressed the
> issues raised in this WG. The little extension does not hurt anyone but it
> does not provide any value in general except to a few implementations which
> are compromised. But it does take you down a slippery slope when you start
> promising that an OCSP responder can do much more than it is supposed to.
> I don¹t think that it is unreasonable for a smart implementer to stop
> signature checking if his responder claims that it checks issuance.
>  
> As for the diginotor case, for some people who say that security breach
> could¹ve been detected early if this practice was in place, there is another
> set of people who believe that attacker could¹ve circumvented these measures
> quite easily with the kind of access he had.
>  
> If you and other folks in the group feel that this text should be added, I
> think at the minimum we also need to do the following
> -          Provide explicit guidance on what the revocation time should be.
> Such certificates are different from Œnormal¹ revoked certificate and their
> revocation time should probably be set to something before the validity of
> issuing CA. This distinction is important for time based validations and long
> term archiving applications
> 
> -          I think it will be useful to indicate in the security
> considerations section, that in such a scenario, CA is compromised and that
> there is a high chance that RP is interacting with a compromised responder.
> 
>  
>  
> 
> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Sunday, October 21, 2012 11:03 AM
> To: Piyush Jain; 'Peter Rybar'; 'Carl Wallace'; 'Simon Tardell'
> Cc: 'Peter Rybar'; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>  
> 
> In line;
> 
>  
> 
> From: Piyush Jain <[e-mail]>
> Date: Sunday, October 21, 2012 7:42 PM
> To: Stefan Santesson <[e-mail]>, 'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>,
> 'Carl Wallace' <[e-mail]>, 'Simon Tardell' <[e-mail]>
> Cc: 'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>, <[e-mail]>
> Subject: RE: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
> 
>  
>> 
>> So what is ³not-issued² - not signed by the CA or not present in CA database?
> 
>  
> 
> Not issued means it has never been issued. What's unclear about that?
> 
>  
> 
> Of course it is not present in the database if it is not issued.
> 
> If you delete things from your database and don't know if this one has been
> deleted, then you don't know that it has never been issued and can't reply
> revoked.
> 
>  
> 
>  
>> 
>> It is unclear to folks who have been using signature verification as a way to
>> check issuance. Isn¹t it a fair conclusion that I do not need to perform
>> signature checks if the responder can check issuance for me?
> 
>  
> 
> No that is not a fair conclusion. These are entirely different things.
> 
>  
>> 
>>  
>> You said that the possibility to send revoked reply only applies when the
>> responder ¹knows¹ that requested certificate has never been issued.
>> Please note that the responder will encounter this kind of request only in
>> two situations. First in which the RP sends a request for a certificate
>> without checking the signature and second in which the responder itself is
>> compromised by virtue of its issuing authority being compromised. In either
>> case what the responder responds with does not matter.
>>  
> 
>  
> 
> Some people are pretty convinced it does (from CAB forum), they are so
> convinced that they are prepared to break compatibility with OCSP. By this
> little extension that hurst no-one, they don't have to.
> 
>  
>> 
>> I¹ve no problem with your proposal to respond with Œrevoked¹ in this
>> situation.
> 
>  
> 
> Good.
> 
>  
>> 
>> I¹ve fundamental problem with the introduction of Œnon-issued¹ concept in
>> OCSP, which seems to provide additional security in this exceptional scenario
>> without actually providing any.
> 
>  
> 
> It provides some, but not much. People keep coming back to that fact that if
> this had been the practice of Diginotar, the security breach would have been
> discovered a lot earlier. So there might be some gain with no pain.
> 
>  
> 
> However, in combination with an extension that adds information, this might
> actually be increasingly valuable.
> 
> If an OCSP responder starts receiving status requests for certs it knows it
> has not issued, it can actually give explicit information about this using an
> extension and it can take adequate measures.
> 
> But in order to respond to the user, it need to pick one of the responses.
> Either good + extension or revoked+extension.
> 
>  
> 
> This proposal is not meant to require any OCSP responder to deal with the
> concept of "non-issued" certs. It merely allows an OCSP responder to respond
> to such request.
> 
>  
>> 
>>  
>> It¹ll be very helpful if I can see at least one practical scenario where this
>> additional text would add value.
> 
>  
> 
> Stated in my previous comments.
> 
>  
> 
> /Stefan
> 
>  
>> 
>>  
>> -Piyush
>> 
>> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[e-mail]]
>> Sent: Sunday, October 21, 2012 8:52 AM
>> To: Piyush Jain; 'Peter Rybar'; 'Carl Wallace'; 'Simon Tardell'
>> Cc: 'Peter Rybar'; [e-mail]
>> Subject: Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>>  
>> 
>> I don't think the "not issued" is unclear.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> The possibility to send a revoked reply only applies then the responder
>> "knows" that the requested certificate has never been issued.
>> 
>> How the responder knows this is totally irrelevant, but unless the responder
>> knows this, it can't choose this option and has to reply "good".
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> It does not make revocation checking non-deterministric.
>> 
>> "good" still means what is declared in the standard (The cert is not known to
>> be revoked, but it may never have been issued).
>> 
>> "revoked" still have a deterministic meaning, that is, don't trust this cert.
>> The old exact semantics was "the cert IS revoked". The new semantic is "the
>> cert is revoked or possibly might never been issued"
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> The new response semantic of revoked is backwards compatible and not less
>> deterministic than the good, response.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> So, I still don't see any practical problems here.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> /Stefan
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> From: Piyush Jain <[e-mail]>
>> Date: Saturday, October 20, 2012 5:48 PM
>> To: Stefan Santesson <[e-mail]>, 'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>,
>> 'Carl Wallace' <[e-mail]>, 'Simon Tardell'
>> <[e-mail]>
>> Cc: 'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>, <[e-mail]>
>> Subject: RE: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>> 
>>  
>>> 
>>> Please see inline
>>>  
>>> 
>>> From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 7:23 PM
>>> To: Piyush Jain; 'Peter Rybar'; 'Carl Wallace'; 'Simon Tardell'
>>> Cc: 'Peter Rybar'; [e-mail]
>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I'm sorry. I fail to the any of the problems you raise.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> If you receive a request for a certificate that you know has never been
>>> issued, and you choose to reply revoked, what problems can you cause?
>>> 
>>> [Piyush] It depends on how you define ³never been issued², which btw becomes
>>> unclear after introduction of the new text. There are two interpretations
>>> 1)      Certificate is not signed by the CA or
>>> 
>>> 2)      Certificate is not present in the database of issued certificates
>>> that CA maintains.
>>> 
>>> One unintended consequence of first interpretation will be that RPs would
>>> stop performing signature checks if their responder/CA publicizes that it
>>> returns revoked for ³non-issued² certificates.
>>> If the interpretation is 2, then this scenario is not possible unless the CA
>>> is compromised.
>>>  
>>> What in your mind is a more appropriate response?
>>> [Piyush] I would say the appropriate response is good (if the certificate is
>>> not marked as revoked), because that is what the RP will see if it consults
>>> a CRL or a responder detached from the CA.
>>> Revoked for ³not issued² adds no value because the only case in which an RP
>>> would send a query for a ³non-issued² certificate is when the CA is
>>> compromised.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> It does not make OCSP more non-deterministic. If you ask status for an
>>> issued cert from a non-broken CA, nothing is non-deterministic.
>>> [Piyush] It does not make OCSP non-deterministic but it makes revocation
>>> checking non-deterministic. The goal of OCSP is to address operational
>>> limitations of CRLs, not functional limitations.  The fact that you¹ll get
>>> different answers from two sources, both of which are authorized by the same
>>> CA makes revocation checking non deterministic.
>>>  
>>> 
>>> If you ask for status for a non-issued certificate, or a bad certificate
>>> from a broken CA, then the result is by default non-deteministic and has
>>> always been. However, choosing a revoked response may save the relying
>>> party, at best, but can hurt no-one
>>> [Piyush] I agree that a revoke response does not hurt anyone. But the point
>>> is that it provides a false sense of additional security to the RP without
>>> providing any. As an RP, I won¹t trust what my responder says if the
>>> authority that certified it is compromised.
>>>  
>>> 
>>> What is your problem on the practical ground.
>>> 
>>> [Piyush]  Let¹s say that we still need to address this scenario and revoked
>>> is the appropriate response. In that case
>>> -          The text needs to be explicit about the revocation time in this
>>> situation. Revoked implies good until a certain date and this distinction is
>>> important for long term archiving applications. For unissued certificate the
>>> revocation time should probably be set to ­infinity.
>>> 
>>> -          It needs to call out that in this particular scenario it is
>>> addressing a functional limitation of CRLs (ability to detect CA compromise)
>>> not an operational limitation.
>>> 
>>> -          I think we need additional text in security considerations to
>>> indicate that RP is communicating with a responder certified by a
>>> compromised CA in this scenario.
>>> 
>>>  
>>>  
>>> 
>>> /Stefan
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> From: Piyush Jain <[e-mail]>
>>> Date: Friday, October 19, 2012 7:34 PM
>>> To: Stefan Santesson <[e-mail]>, 'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>,
>>> 'Carl Wallace' <[e-mail]>, 'Simon Tardell'
>>> <[e-mail]>
>>> Cc: 'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>, <[e-mail]>
>>> Subject: RE: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>>> 
>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> Stefan,
>>>>  
>>>> I think some of you interpretations below are twisted to accommodate the
>>>> new provisions for providing revoked responses for unissued certificates.
>>>> Providing responses for expired certificates is within the scope of 2560
>>>> using archive cutoff extension.
>>>>  
>>>> The original authors of 2560 can correct me if I¹m wrong, but it is my
>>>> understanding that a response from OCSP responder is not supposed to
>>>> indicate if a certificate is good or bad but to indicate if a certificate
>>>> is revoked or unrevoked by the issuing authority. The fact that certificate
>>>> is issued by the CA is checked by the RP by verifying the signature on the
>>>> certificate.
>>>>  
>>>> This draft introduces the concept of returning revoked responses for
>>>> unissued certificates. There are many unintended consequences of this
>>>> approach
>>>> -          Revocation statuses become non-deterministic based on who you
>>>> are asking (A responder with access to CA database vs. one without vs.
>>>> checking status off a CRL). If I¹m archiving a signed document with the
>>>> relevant artifacts to determine the validity status of the document, this
>>>> becomes a huge problem. Note that a revoked status implies that certificate
>>>> was good between the time of its issuance and that of its revocation. Any
>>>> document that is signed within that period should still be considered
>>>> valid.
>>>> 
>>>> -          It would confuse an implementer about what ³non-issued² means.
>>>> The fact that the CA signed the certificate implies it was issued. If a
>>>> certificate is issued fraudulently, based on its security practices, it is
>>>> up to the CA to either revoke the issued certificate, or ask its issuing
>>>> authority to revoke its own certificate.
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> -Piyush
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of
>>>> Stefan Santesson
>>>> Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 7:25 AM
>>>> To: Peter Rybar; 'Carl Wallace'; 'Simon Tardell'
>>>> Cc: 'Peter Rybar'; [e-mail]
>>>> Subject: Re: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> Peter,
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> An OCSP responder is by default a service providing information about
>>>> current certificates.
>>>> 
>>>> The default response you get from an OCSP responder is "good" unless the
>>>> cert is known to be bad or not a cert the responder can provide status for.
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> If you need it to respond about old certificates, and as a client know that
>>>> the responder does this in a way that suits your needs, you will need to
>>>> add an extension.
>>>> 
>>>> Such extension will not be part of the rfc256bis effort.
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> Is there any text in the current draft that you think is unclear on this?
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> /Stefan
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> From: Peter Rybar <[e-mail]>
>>>> Date: Friday, October 19, 2012 3:12 PM
>>>> To: 'Carl Wallace' <[e-mail]>, 'Simon Tardell'
>>>> <[e-mail]>
>>>> Cc: 'Peter Rybar' <[e-mail]>, Stefan Santesson
>>>> <[e-mail]>, <[e-mail]>
>>>> Subject: RE: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Well, yes, sort of. You can only be sure to validate a signature at the
>>>>>> moment of production.
>>>>> 
>>>>>  
>>>>> 
>>>>> What if the signature key was compromised at the moment of production but
>>>>> is not yet on a revocation list?
>>>>> [PR] According to clause 2.4  -  thisUpdate: The time at which the status
>>>>> being indicated is known to be correct
>>>>> It means when signature time-stamp time is X then any OCSP responses with
>>>>> thisUpdate time X+y are sufficient to validate because the status is
>>>>> correct. 
>>>>> Y is in the interval <0, producedAt - X>
>>>>> 
>>>>>  
>>>>>> At any later point in time the signature key may be compromised, or the
>>>>>> algorithms involved may have become to weak. (In which case the time of
>>>>>> revocation in the OCSP response is worth nothing to you). The risk
>>>>>> increases as time passes. And of course, the revocation information may
>>>>>> not be kept around after the expiry of the certificate.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> That's why you should validate signatures as soon as possible.
>>>>> 
>>>>>  
>>>>> 
>>>>> For these archival purposes wouldn't it be better to have the final
>>>>> revocation list before removed due to expiry?  In any case, you'd need
>>>>> verification information collected after some grace period following
>>>>> moment of production.
>>>>> 
>>>>> [PR] Grace period is not a fixed value of the time interval.
>>>>> Grace period is changeable because the first OCSP response with thisUpdate
>>>>> time value > than time of signature time-stamp contains correct status.
>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> If you need to ascertain that a signature was valid at a later time, you
>>>>>> have to trust your system that it performed the validation at the time it
>>>>>> first received the signature. That trust must be established through some
>>>>>> kind of mix of policies and technical measures (such as timestamping).
>>>>> 
>>>>>  
>>>>> 
>>>>> In the dark corner just beyond the dark corner that is SCVP, there's a
>>>>> spec (RFC 5276) that defines a binding of evidence records to artifacts
>>>>> that can be returned viaSCVP.  This provides for timestamping.
>>>>> [PR] The validation is simplified when OCSP response with positive
>>>>> statement as a hash value of requested certificate is used.
>>>>> Positive statement is evidence that OCSP know the status of certificate
>>>>> and also protect the integrity of certificate with a new more secure hash
>>>>> algorithm.
>>>>> 
>>>>>  
>>>>> Peter Rybar
>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Simon Tardell,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Technology Nexus.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Fri, Oct 19, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Peter Rybar <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>>>> Stefan,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have a question about the present OCSP RFC and at the end of the mail
>>>>>> about the new situation which will happen according to your new proposal.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The presence of the positive statement in OCSP response is important for
>>>>>> electronic signature validations, especially for an expired certificate.
>>>>>> Positive statement is the hash value of a certificate whose status is
>>>>>> provided in OCSP response.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Electronic signature validation is usually about the signatures created
>>>>>> in the past and validated now, when the certificate is expired.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> When the certificate expires then revocation is usually removed from CRL
>>>>>> and the revoked certificate can be provided as "good" in OCSP response.
>>>>>> Is it acceptable? I think not.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> According to your new draft there is not defined a value of
>>>>>> revocationTime.
>>>>>> RFC must also define the value of revocationTime when the certificate
>>>>>> which was never issued is as "revoked".
>>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Have you also covered the situation when the certificate is expired,
>>>>>> REMOVED FROM CRL and will be provided as revoked with incorrect
>>>>>> revocationTime e.g.with the value before or after the revocationTime
>>>>>> which was present in the removed record from CRL?
>>>>>> Because according to sentence in your draft ""revoked" - This state
>>>>>> SHOULD also be returned if the responder knows that the requested
>>>>>> certificate has never been issued." the following situation can happen:
>>>>>> when certificate is removed from CRL after expiration and CA/OCSP
>>>>>> responder is responsible for this certificate but have not record about
>>>>>> expired certificate and for that reason it is identified as "never been
>>>>>> issued".
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>> revoked     [1]     IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>    RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
>>>>>>        revocationTime              GeneralizedTime,
>>>>>>        revocationReason    [0]     EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> As you have mentioned in the mail:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "On the "revoked" state, the old spec did not even consider the case of a
>>>>>> certificate being requested where the OCSP responder knows that the
>>>>>> certificate was never issued."
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "It simply recommend a known to be bad certificate to result
>>>>>> in "revoked" in order to prevent damage as far as possible. It also opens
>>>>>> for definition of new extensions through which such knowledge could be
>>>>>> obtained."
>>>>>> Peter Rybar
>>>>>> National Security Authority
>>>>>> Information Security and Electronic Signature Department
>>>>>> Budatinska 30, 850 07 Bratislava 57, Slovak Republic
>>>>>> e-mail: [e-mail]
>>>>>> e-mail: [e-mail]
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>> From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of
>>>>>> Stefan Santesson
>>>>>> Sent: Monday, October 15, 2012 1:49 AM
>>>>>> To: [e-mail]
>>>>>> Subject: [pkix] New draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-06
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> All,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have just posted an update of rfc2560bis (OCSP update) after carefully
>>>>>> reviewing all comments on the list.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Some notes about the update:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> - Added the previous OCSP editors with updated affiliations.
>>>>>> - Added some calcifications on ResponderID as suggested by Simon
>>>>>> Josefsson.
>>>>>> - Updated the clarifications on Authorized responders. The requirements
>>>>>> have not changed. I just tried to improve the text.
>>>>>> - Updated a clarification on the "revoked" state to be the preferred
>>>>>> response if a certificate is known by the responder to never have been
>>>>>> issued.
>>>>>> - Some minor editorial nits.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Regarding backwards compatibility I mean that none of the clarifications
>>>>>> changes RFC 2560.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Authorized responders it has always been the case that a responder
>>>>>> certificate issued with the same key as was used to issue the certificate
>>>>>> being checked for revocation, represents a valid Authorized responder.
>>>>>> There has never been an explicit requirement to support key rollover and
>>>>>> key rollover support has never been in the "spirit" of the original
>>>>>> standard as it clearly attempted to provide direct cryptographic binding
>>>>>> between the responder and the CA.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On the "revoked" state, the old spec did not even consider the case of a
>>>>>> certificate being requested where the OCSP responder knows that the
>>>>>> certificate was never issued. It is clearly counterproductive to respond
>>>>>> good when a certificate is known to be bad. A responder must pick one
>>>>>> response and picking "revoked" breaks nothing, but has the desired
>>>>>> effect,
>>>>>> that is, to prevent the certificate from being accepted. The current text
>>>>>> makes clear that there is no mechanism in the current standard by which a
>>>>>> client can know how a responder will respond to a request for a not
>>>>>> issued
>>>>>> certificate. It simply recommend a known to be bad certificate to result
>>>>>> in "revoked" in order to prevent damage as far as possible. It also opens
>>>>>> for definition of new extensions through which such knowledge could be
>>>>>> obtained.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The current updates also clearly opens a path for the CAB forum efforts
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> define a suitable solution for server certificates.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have not, even thug suggested, added any requirements on what clients
>>>>>> should do with the checked cert as a result of a particular response. I
>>>>>> don't believe such requirements are suitable as it is policy and not
>>>>>> protocol. We have no right to demand that all systems MUST reject any
>>>>>> certificate for any reason as they may have a local policy that overrules
>>>>>> the OCSP response. This protocol only provides information about the cert
>>>>>> status, it does not mandate validation policy.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have not included any of the substantial changes i the Pinkas draft. I
>>>>>> want to wait for a list of motivation for each change before including
>>>>>> any
>>>>>> of them. So there changed may be up for debate before this draft is ready
>>>>>> for WGLC.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> /Stefan
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> pkix mailing list
>>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix
>>>>>> 
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