Re: [pkix] Critical certificate policies extension

Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> Thu, 21 July 2022 06:09 UTC

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Niklas Matthies <pkix@nmhq.net>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pkix] Critical certificate policies extension
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Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2022 06:09:18 +0000
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Critical certificate policies extension
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Niklas Matthies <pkix@nmhq.net> writes:

>But you don't have different sets of applicable extension-specific
>requirements depending on whether the extension is critical or not.

It certainly doesn't seem to be correct behaviour.  When something like this
crops up in code, particularly when it's been implemented as a configurable
option, it's often because some large customer asked for it and it was made
configurable because everyone else doesn't want it that way... does the US
Federal PKI or other government PKI require this behaviour?

Peter.