Re: Logotypes in certificates

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Wed, 21 March 2001 04:57 UTC

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Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2001 23:56:53 -0500
To: Dean Povey <povey@dstc.qut.edu.au>
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Subject: Re: Logotypes in certificates
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
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Dean and Stefan,

As a security kinda' guy, I always approach this from the "what will 
the bad giy do" perspective.  From that perspective, I worry that a 
TTP CA will cerfity company X, putting the company X logo in the 
cert. Then company X will issue a cert to a subordinate CA, and put 
in that cert an inappropriate logo. It is not realistic for an app to 
display a chain of logos, and expect a user to pay attention, any 
more that if one displayed a chain of DNs.  I still maintain that we 
can agree on what would be a reasonable set of circumstances in which 
the logo extension would be useful and safe, but I don't see a 
technical means of enforcing these circumstances without changes to 
the path validation algorithm. I am open to suggestions that provide 
the necessary controls and don't have this unfortunate side effect, 
but I have yet to see an example of such.

Steve