Re: [pkix] Connected Cars. Upgradable/Replaceable IoT systems. Re: Managing Long-Lived CA certs

Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> Mon, 24 July 2017 14:11 UTC

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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, "pkix@ietf.org" <pkix@ietf.org>
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From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com>
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Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 10:11:26 -0400
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Connected Cars. Upgradable/Replaceable IoT systems. Re: Managing Long-Lived CA certs
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On 07/24/2017 09:54 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> writes:
>
>> The IEEE 1609.2 standard for Vehicle safety messaging has a 'monster' PKI
>> with certificate management.  To put it mildly.
> Not just a monster PKI, a monster in general.  They invented their own
> gratuitously incompatible way of doing everything possible (message security,
> certificates, you name it, including a pile of novel security mechanisms never
> before deployed at any real-world scale).
>
> The thing with X.509, CMS, PGP, whatever you want to use is that after about
> twenty years of public naming and shaming vendors have got at least some of
> the bits right (but see for example the thread currently running on mozilla-
> dev about CAs all over the world issuing certs for domain names that can't be
> validated, in other words that were never checked by the CA before the certs
> were issued).
>
> OTOH the 1609.2 stuff, which goes way beyond what any standard public CA has
> ever attempted (e.g. SCMS or Secure Credential Management System, which is...
> no, it's too horrible to go into) will be used in a closed, non-public
> environment where little if anything will ever be tested or checked for
> correctness.
>
> Until the Black Hat and Defcon presentations start appearing...
>
>> I worked on three telematics certificate systems.
> I got exposed to 1609.2.  My response was that there simply wasn't enough
> money in existence to get me to try and make that thing work.

I made a counter proposal which was rejected becuase it was a change in 
direction.  So I saw that the horses had already left the barn and just 
sit back and watch.

And this may be the largest scale ever attempted.  I don't know of any 
PKI with more than 100M entities enrolled.  Though some of the national 
ID systems are in this size.

But hopefully we are not talking 1609.2; I only mentioned it for some 
level of completeness in the automotive environment.