Re: [pkix] Updated elliptic curve drafts

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Fri, 16 October 2015 13:07 UTC

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From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 09:07:11 -0400
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Updated elliptic curve drafts
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Simon,

Your response matches what I was about to say in response to PHB.
How a public key carried in a cert is employed for key agreement is
the job of a WG that defines how to use the key. It is not a topic
for discussion in PKIX.

Steve


>> I strongly oppose any new crypto that does not include a fix for the
>> ephemeral keygen.
> How is that concern relevant for a new PKIX signature/publickey
> algorithm?  I would assume this is relevant for TLS, OpenPGP, CMS, or
> other higher level protocols, but I don't follow how anything could be
> done at the PKIX level to help here.  Can you elaborate please?
>
> /Simon
>
>