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Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs

"Dr. Pala" <director@openca.org> Mon, 17 July 2017 16:29 UTC

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References: <467c8936-f6aa-0853-878c-24fc8803c599@openca.org> <D5925287.981D0%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
From: "Dr. Pala" <director@openca.org>
Organization: OpenCA Labs
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Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 18:29:05 +0200
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Subject: Re: [pkix] Managing Long-Lived CA certs
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Hi Carl,

you are totally right :D That case would be covered by the revocation of 
the CA key. However, there are also other types of compromises (e.g., 
the system is compromised, but the key is not - certificates issued by 
non-authorized person).

Keep in mind that in the ecosystem where this happens (device certs and 
many others) certificate revocation is not really checked... this would 
limit the exposure for non-catastrophic compromise events.

Does this make sense ? What do you think ?

Cheers,
Max

[*] = I know that checking revocation is still, regrettably, not common...

On 7/17/17 5:42 PM, Carl Wallace wrote:
> [...]
> [CW] Wouldn't the protection need to come in the form of revocation? 
> If the CA key is compromised, the validity period in certificates 
> cannot be trusted. [...]

-- 
Best Regards,
Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D.
OpenCA Labs Director
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