[pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8789)
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Subject: [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8789)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5280, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile". -------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid8789 -------------------------------------- Type: Technical Reported by: Elizabeth Peraza Slator <elizabethpslator@gmail.com> Section: GLOBAL Original Text ------------- Section 4.2.1.12 says: id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } -- TLS WWW server authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } -- TLS WWW client authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature -- and/or keyAgreement It should say: id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } -- TLS server authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } -- TLS client authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature -- and/or keyAgreement Notes: The proposed change removes the WWW part of the description. In practice these object identifiers are used for server and client applications, but not necessarily web applications. In particular: - openssl verification considers them unconditionally even if the server is not a web server or the client a web client - There is no object identifier that can be used for protocols like SMTP, IMAP, POP3, LDAP, radius, ...; in practice all these protocols are deployed with the identifiers for WWW - Standards like common criteria assume that these object identifiers are for generic server and clients [0]. [0]. https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/-442-/#FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 Report New Errata Corrected Text -------------- Section 4.2.1.12 says: id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } -- TLS WWW server authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } -- TLS WWW client authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature -- and/or keyAgreement It should say: id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } -- TLS server authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } -- TLS client authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature -- and/or keyAgreement Notes: The proposed change removes the WWW part of the description. In practice these object identifiers are used for server and client applications, but not necessarily web applications. In particular: - openssl verification considers them unconditionally even if the server is not a web server or the client a web client - There is no object identifier that can be used for protocols like SMTP, IMAP, POP3, LDAP, radius, ...; in practice all these protocols are deployed with the identifiers for WWW - Standards like common criteria assume that these object identifiers are for generic server and clients [0]. [0]. https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/-442-/#FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 Report New Errata Notes ----- Thank you very much Instructions: ------------- This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". (If it is spam, it will be removed shortly by the RFC Production Center.) Please use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party will log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. -------------------------------------- RFC5280 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3280bis-11) -------------------------------------- Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile Publication Date : May 2008 Author(s) : D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG
- [pkix] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8789) RFC Errata System
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Paul Hoffman
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Sean Turner
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Michael StJohns
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Tim Hollebeek
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Paul Hoffman
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Tim Hollebeek
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Paul Hoffman
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Deb Cooley
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… StJohns, Michael
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Deb Cooley
- [pkix] Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (8… Paul Wouters