Re: [pkix] [saag] Considerations and Clarifications about draft-nir-saag-star-01

[Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>]

[spasm and pkix to bcc; please continue discussion on one list only]

Hi Max,

On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 01:08:07PM +0000, Dr. Pala wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> unfortunately I missed the sec-dispatch session, but I have some
> important considerations about the document. In general, short-lived
> certificates have been around for many years and for many different
> applications (nothing new here), however nobody who have been working
> with PKI long enough would actually made the case that the security
> levels of short-lived-no-revo and any-lived-plus-revo are the same
> (which seems the life-motif of the presentation and the document itself).
> 
> Other aspects that I think shall be revisited are the lack of
> considerations about the usability of deployed infrastructures (when no
> revocation is assumed) and some wrong considerations in the document
> about validity periods of OCSP Responses and CRLs (that clearly
> undermine the equivalence claim).

It would probably be helpful if you included a description of what
attacker capabilities are present in your mental model.  If the
attacker is modelled as being in control of the network (and
revocation status is carried over HTTP-not-S) then the claim of
equivalence between short-lived certs and "short-lived" OCSP holds
much more weight.  When you say that a second party can get the
valid revocation status information, that implies that the attacker
does *not* have full control over the network -- so what exactly can
and cannot the attacker do?

-Ben