[plasma] FW: New Version Notification for draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-10.txt

[Trevor Freeman <[e-mail]>]

Hi folks,

Here is v10 of the requirements draft with Peter Yee's comments plus some requirements clean up

Attached is the updated word doc with my comments to Peter.

Trevor 

-----Original Message-----
From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Monday, May 19, 2014 5:18 PM
To: Patrick Patterson; Trevor Freeman; Jim Schaad; Jim Schaad; Patrick Patterson; Trevor Freeman
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-10.txt


A new version of I-D, draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-10.txt
has been successfully submitted by Trevor Freeman and posted to the IETF repository.

Name:		draft-freeman-plasma-requirements
Revision:	10
Title:		Requirements for Message Access Control
Document date:	2014-05-19
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		49
URL:            http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-10.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-freeman-plasma-requirements/
Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-10
Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-10

Abstract:
  S/MIME delivers confidentiality, integrity, and data origination
  authentication for email. However, there are many situations where
  organizations also want robust access control applied to information
  in messages. The Enhanced Security Services (ESS) RFC5035 for S/MIME
  defines an access control mechanism for email, but the  access check
  happens after the data is decrypted by the recipient which devalues
  the protection afforded by the cryptography and provides very weak
  guarantees of policy compliance. Another major issues for S/MIME is
  its dependency on a single type of identity credential, an X.509
  certificate. Many users on the Internet today do not have X.509
  certificates and therefore cannot use S/MIME.  Furthermore, the
  requirement to discover the X.509 certificate for every recipient of
  an encrypted message by the sender has proven to be an unreliable
  process for a number of reasons.

  This document presents requirements for an alternative model to ESS to
  address the identified issues with access control in order to deliver
  more robust compliance for S/MIME protected messages. This document
  describes an access control model which uses cryptographic keys to
  enforce access control policy decisions where the policy check is
  performed prior to the decryption of the message contents. This
  authorization model can be instantiated using many existing standard
  and is in not intended to be a one off just for email and can also be
  applied to other data types.

  This document also presents requirements for the abstraction of the
  specifics of the authentication technologies used by S/MIME users. The
  abstraction makes it possible for other forms of authentication
  credentials to be used with S/MIME thereby enabling much broader
  adoption. The authentication abstraction model also removes the
  dependency on the need to discover encryption keys by the sender. This
  abstraction can be used independently from access control to enable
  simple scenarios where authentication of the recipient is sufficient
  to grant access to the message.

  The name Plasma was assigned to this effort as part of the IETF
  process. It is derived from PoLicy enhAnced Secure eMAil.

                                                                                  


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