Re: [pntaw] More on draft-hutton-rtcweb-nat-firewall-considerations

Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> Wed, 25 September 2013 20:15 UTC

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Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 12:15:11 -0800
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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To: Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [pntaw] More on draft-hutton-rtcweb-nat-firewall-considerations
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On 9/25/13 10:17 AM, Dan Wing wrote:
> My strawman is:  arbitrary UDP pinholes through the firewall are
> denied, but WebRTC sessions originated by certain domains (or by all
> domains?) are permitted to create UDP pinholes through the firewall.

This is where the IETF really is terribly limited by not having
more participation from people who actually run networks.

The most common case is that all outgoing traffic is permitted
but it's not the only case.  I've seen some networks in which
nearly nothing is allowed that's not proxied, and not just
inside the DOD.  In those environments it's likely that they
wouldn't permit any WebRTC traffic.  But there are networks
access policies in-between maximally strict and maximally lax
and that's the area that needs to be considered, I think.
It seems to me that the primary question is whether or not the
network administrators have the tools to be able to selectively
disallow traffic at their network boundaries.

Melinda