Re: ISOC Trustees - Articles 4, 5, and 6

["practic![e-mail]" <[e-mail]>]

Thanks Vint,


section 4, Restrictions on earnings distribution and lobbying
section 5, Terms of disolution or liquidation
section 6, Amendment of the charter, by 4/5ths affirmative vote of Trustees,
	   except affecting sections 4, 5, and 6, by unanimous consent

Several things puzzle me, I'll take them in the order which seems most
important to me, that is, in reverse order:

	6A Requiring a 4/5ths vote of a body to amend it's own enabling
	   legislation seems awfully draconian, in effect, it means that
	   no fundamental policy change is possible if a 21% hold-out
	   group (or aggregate of groups) exists. This means that this
	   body is going to be _very_ stable over time in its overall
	   scope and policy.

	6B Requiring a unanimous consent to amend these sections, especially
	   section 6, seems even more unable to accomidate change. When
	   I first learned of this language, I asked myself, "What are the
	   potential membership-initiated inititives for change which _must_
	   be made subject to the stay by one wiser voice?" Its been several
	   weeks, and I still come up empty on that one, except in the area
	   I'd least hoped to find -- amendment to the amendment process.

	   Alterations in how revenues are spent or a change in the Hatch
	   Act(1) language in #4? It isn't likely that even a bare majority 
	   would seek to benefit or pay unreasonable compensation to any
	   person, so is it in the Hatch Act-like limits to non-substantial
	   activities, or the participation in or intervention in political
	   campaigns for public office?

	   I don't understand the first of these, since I don't see much
	   point in an ISoc-as-generally-described which dosen't pay great
	   attention to enabling legislation in the various PTT-equivalent
	   zones of the world, whether law or agency regulation, and I don't
	   know what propaganda is, aside from someone extolling the virtues
	   of OSI, or listening to Radia Havana.

	   The last clause of section 4 seems clear enough, though I would
	   have stuck in a specific exception for potential candidates to
	   public office who advocated exceptionally backward or foresighted
	   legislation w.r.t. policy concerning networks.

	   Turning to section 5, liquidation for a "wise man" hold-out issue,
	   I again just don't find a smoking gun. Maybe I'm just ignorant.

	   So, the last place to find a compelling motivation for unanimity
	   of the Trustees is back in section 6 itself as far as I can see,
	   which means that in effect, it is the modification of this clause,
	   or the 4/5ths clause, which are to be protected from unwise
	   membership-initiated amendment.

Vint has asked that we (the POISED list) take a moment to think about the
long-term health of the Internet and the ISoc. I've taken that moment to
ask "what is sought by, and what are the probable consequences" of two
phrases in the ISoc charter. Earlier I took more than a moment to read and
comment on the I-D, with the exception of the proposed PB role in both the
"fair hearings" and external liason, without effect. Earlier still I voiced
my disapointment that for weeks this area of work is almost exclusively
about who waggles whom, a thrilling topic for some I am sure. It is no
secret that I think far too much of the "internet agenda" is set by for-
profits, frequently with little obvious enlightened self-interest, and by
agencies subject to unrealistic, too facile notions of "policy" or their
own role in developing technology or engineering its use.

I _really_ don't think that it is helpful to characterize anyone's desire
that the ISoc trustees or spokesperson finally "bell the cat", and explain
to the non-POISED IETF the new realities as seeking a moment of drama. How
sad that so important an issue has an "author of compromise" (the I-D) who
actually thinks in such terms.

Personally I've had enough. I'm careful about the organizations I spend my
working time in or make significant donations of time or concern to. Some
rationalization has to be present or it just isn't worth it. My event
horizon for when constructive work may be done, and I personally don't
consider locating the IETF in any constellation of hierarchies to be very
constructive, is apparently too small or limited.

Eric

Notes:

1. The Hatch Act is a US Federal law restricting political lobbying by Civil
   Service employees.