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Re: [POSH] [xmpp] Comments/questions on draft-miller-posh-00

Dave Cridland <dave@cridland.net> Wed, 31 July 2013 09:09 UTC

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Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2013 10:01:20 +0100
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From: Dave Cridland <dave@cridland.net>
To: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
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Cc: Philipp Hancke <fippo@goodadvice.pages.de>, "<posh@ietf.org>" <posh@ietf.org>, XMPP Working Group <xmpp@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [POSH] [xmpp] Comments/questions on draft-miller-posh-00
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On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 9:18 AM, Matt Miller (mamille2)
<mamille2@cisco.com>wrote:

> I will note that there is general queasiness with suspending disbelief on
> a connection, accepting the TLS handshake but then actually verifying  (and
> potentially failing) the connection because of TLS failings; not the least
> of which is the potential for abuse is very very great.  This also means
> that any error reporting that one might get from their TLS implementations
> for better error reporting is lost.
>

If there is queasiness here it's misplaced. The case for abuse here is
predicated on the TLS handshake being the authorization, which it is not in
any SASL based protocol.

So in XMPP, we must already perform auth during the SASL exchange, and
during the <db:result/>, too.

If you have a protocol which conflates authentication and authorization, of
course, then the situation is different.

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