Re: [ppsp] questions about merkle hash tree mechanism for integrity protection of content between peers
Dusan Gabrijelcic <dusan@e5.ijs.si> Wed, 07 November 2012 17:44 UTC
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From: Dusan Gabrijelcic <dusan@e5.ijs.si>
Date: Wed, 07 Nov 2012 18:43:55 +0100
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Subject: Re: [ppsp] questions about merkle hash tree mechanism for integrity protection of content between peers
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Hi Deng, On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Arno Bakker <arno@cs.vu.nl> wrote: > On 05/11/2012 18:41, 邓灵莉/Lingli Deng wrote: > >> Hi Arno, >> >> Thank you for the impressive speech and demos this morning. >> >> > 2)For ECS proposal, I doubt the one-to-one encryption negotiation is >> scalable for a peer serving more than one peers at a time. Since you are >> not targeting DRM requirements, revocable group keys may suite your >> needs, while the data can be encrypted once and for all given the group >> membership remains unchanged. >> >> > Dusan? > I hope I had understood your questions correctly. According to our tests and evaluations the ECS cryptographic handshake using plain digital signature (one-to-one encryption negotiation) should scale reasonably well for expected peers load (number of peers in swam(s), in connection, regarding churn and taking in account normal peer settings). Ordinary host should easily handle few hundreds of ECS handshakes per second (measured through OpenSSL) which should be sufficient even for large number of concurrently open connections and, lets say, 1% churn per second. The group key and encrypting the content (not exchanged data in connection since it is not always the same) once for all would really decrease the load on peer but it is regarded as highly insecure, except in very restricted settings. As you mention static group membership, the ECS protocol doesn't assume any limitations on group membership; peers can join and leave at will (but according the credentials they posses). And, the protocol provides in application data communication protection other security services besides confidentially (encryption) as well. Nowadays they are standard in most network protocols, for example in IPSec or TLS/DTLS. Things can get harsher on heavily loaded ingest points, but here a swarm initiator has other mechanisms that can be used to mitigate the load, like auxiliary peers, cryptographic accelerators (quite common in VPN/SSL settings), cloud seeding, etc. Hope this answers your questions. Kind regards, Dusan. -- ~~~~~~~~~~ Dusan Gabrijelcic e-mail: dusan@e5.ijs.si
- Re: [ppsp] questions about merkle hash tree mecha… Arno Bakker
- Re: [ppsp] questions about merkle hash tree mecha… Dusan Gabrijelcic