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Re: [Pqc] Mapping the state of PQC and IETF - ssh

Alexandre Petrescu <alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com> Mon, 24 April 2023 10:05 UTC

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To: Thom Wiggers <thom@thomwiggers.nl>
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From: Alexandre Petrescu <alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Pqc] Mapping the state of PQC and IETF - ssh
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I wonder whether openssh's NTRUPrime is made for, or can do, hash
signatures of files?  (in the same manner as MD5 or SHA-256 can do 'file
signatures' as proof of non-tampering).

Or maybe there is another algo and widely available software that could
do some signatures that could be qualified somehow as more 'resistant',
or more 'quantum' than MD5 or SHA-256.

I know that SHA-512 can be considered stronger than SHA-256, but I do
not know whether SHA-256 could be qualified somehow as 'quantum
resistant'?  Or is SHA-512 at a same risk as earlier crypto algorithms
facing brute force attacks from potential quantum computers?

Alex

Le 10/03/2023 à 16:16, Thom Wiggers a écrit :
> Hi Alexandre
> 
> Op vr 10 mrt 2023 om 15:19 schreef Alexandre Petrescu 
> <alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com
> <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com>>:
> 
> Let me ask this: when I call 'ssh' in command line without any other 
> argument than the destination host address - is NTRUPrime being
> used? Or do I have to type in some additional option like -qr or
> -ntruprime or similar?
> 
> 
> If you have SSH 8.9 or above AND the remote server supports NTRU
> Prime, that should be used by default, yes, unless you have something
> else configured. If you want to force it, you can do:
> 
> ssh -o KexAlgorithms=sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com 
> <mailto:sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com> <user>@<hostname>
> 
> If the remote server does not support it, SSH will tell you.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Thom
> 
> Alex
> 
>> 
>> Cheers,
>> 
>> Thom
>> 
>> Alex
>> 
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