Re: [Pqc] Listing pointers to not-yet-standardized PQC algorithms

[Alexandre Petrescu <[e-mail]>]

Le 04/05/2023 à 00:56, Paul Hoffman a écrit :
> Greetings again. The grand list of pointers at 
> <https://github.com/ietf-wg-pquip/state-of-protocols-and-pqc> 
> primarily lists Internet Drafts and RFCs.
> 
> We know that the protocols themselves are being developed elsewhere,
>  primarily (but not exclusively) at NIST. NIST has said that it will
>  publish standards for CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALs-Dilithium, Falcon, 
> and SPHINX+ next year, and has more informally said that it will 
> publish standards for other KEM finalists (Classic McEliece, BIKE, 
> and HQC). Should this WG help let IETF developers know about these 
> algorithms and their status at NIST; if so, how?
> 
> Those of us following the European PQC world know that there is still
> a lot of interest in some non-NIST algorithms, particularly FrodoKEM.
> FrodoKEM is being standardized in ISO. Should this WG let IETF
> developers know about these algorithms? If so, how do we bound this
> list to prevent us from promoting MyMostlyUnreviewedKEM without 
> enough context?

In the context of this discussion.

With the necessary excuses if the text below is not entirely appropriate
here.

I feel like it is worth mentioning - FYI - that the EU-US TTC
established a Task Force a few days ago about 'quantum'.
https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/EU-US-TTC/news/4th-eu-us-trade-and-technology-council-ministerial-meeting-lulea-sweden 
(search for 'quantum').

I think this EU-US TTC discussion approach might help towards reducing
potential future export control issues, if that is the case in any way.

In that URL's text, 'quantum' might mean anything from 'quantum
gravimetry', quantum computing, QKD or migration to post-quantum algos
or quantum-resistance.  For my part, I know that when I asked for it I
asked specifically for 'quantum resistance' of algos.  I am not sure how
was it received, in which context already present, etc.  But the idea is
there.

For example, it might be that in Europe someone might be interested in
developping own post-quantum algo, or why not making an European
NIST-like contest altogether.  Such a tendency (if it exists at all, it
might not) might seem to diverge from a more coherent approach to crypto
- open crypto, many eyes - but might help towards a safer protection in
particular cases.

For my part, I am not able to make up a mind about this topic.

So, I think an EU-US interaction, in such a focused Task Force, can only
be positive in this case.

Alex

> 
> --Paul Hoffman
>