Re: [precis] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-precis-7613bis-07

Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im> Mon, 26 June 2017 17:40 UTC

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To: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>, secdir@ietf.org
References: <149845620057.31750.11952736688634266964@ietfa.amsl.com>
Cc: draft-ietf-precis-7613bis.all@ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, precis@ietf.org
From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
Message-ID: <18393d54-4882-e3f3-a0b0-7af814d51f65@stpeter.im>
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2017 11:40:08 -0600
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Subject: Re: [precis] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-precis-7613bis-07
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Hi Joe, thanks for the review. Comments inline.

On 6/25/17 11:50 PM, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> Reviewer: Joseph Salowey
> Review result: Has Nits
> 
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
> these comments just like any other last call comments.
> 
> The summary of the review is document is ready with nits.
> 
> This document is an update to RFC 7613.   A few Minor comments:
> 
> 1.  I think it would be good to show the zero-length password is not allowed in
> table 4 (18 | <> | zero-length password).   There are lots of cases where
> allowing zero-length passwords has led to problems.  Disallowing zero-length
> passwords is helpful.

Good point - we'll add that.

> 2.  Comparisons of passwords is a touchy subject.   I can't think of a case
> where it would be preferable to do a direct password comparison.   In most
> cases the comparison will be done against a salted-hashed transform of the
> password or involve some other cryptographic operation.   I think it would be
> good to discuss this briefly in the security considerations section, sample
> text below
> 
> "Password Comparison
> 
> Verification of passwords during authentication will not use the comparison
> defined in section 4.2.3.   Instead cryptographic calculations are performed to
> verify the password.   In most cases the password will be prepared as in
> section 4.2.1 and meet the rules enforced in section 4.2.2 before the
> calculations are performed."

That's helpful - thanks for the suggested test. A forward pointer from
Section 4.2.3 also seems desirable.

Peter