Re: [Privacy-pass] Detecting malicious registries/servers

Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com> Mon, 03 August 2020 22:00 UTC

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From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2020 17:59:59 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHbrMsD9RtVS+zLscxvDJrynzDsuogEpdWqvBJRJVg2czkC+xg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Chelsea Komlo <chelsea.komlo@gmail.com>
Cc: privacy-pass@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Privacy-pass] Detecting malicious registries/servers
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I found your and Richard's comment during the meeting particularly
insightful on this point: we should clarify the assumptions Privacy Pass
has to make about the intrinsic identifiability of client requests.  For
example, if Privacy Pass necessarily assumes that the Client's connections
to Verifiers are unlinkable, then perhaps we can simply declare that the
Client's connections to Registries must be similarly unlinkable.

The mechanism for ensuring that unlinkability might be out of scope for us,
but we would need to describe the requirements for it.

On Mon, Aug 3, 2020 at 5:16 PM Chelsea Komlo <chelsea.komlo@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> One question that has been raised is how clients can detect registry or
> server misbehavior. One particular concern is the possibility that
> registries or servers can perform targeted attacks by publishing different
> keys to specific users without detection (resulting in a small anonymity
> set).
>
> While client-side gossip protocols or use of anonymity networks give the
> client an option to detect such targeted attacks, these options are not
> necessarily generalizable.
>
> However, I think if we introduce the assumption that *at least one*
> registry is acting honestly, then this problem may be easier to solve.
>
> Registries just need to add an additional capability to query other
> registries on behalf of a client (if the client specifies this in their
> request). In doing so, they can act as a one-hop proxy for the client. If
> clients perform these requests periodically through a series of
> randomly-chosen registries, they should eventually be able to detect
> misbehavior, assuming one of the registries is acting honestly.
>
> Chris Wood pointed out to me that the above approach may have false
> positives when a server rotates their key, so adding some kind of
> "suspected" and "failed state" with retries might help get around such edge
> cases.
>
> Thanks,
> Chelsea
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