[Qirg] Attacking the Quantum Internet

Rodney Van Meter <rdv@sfc.wide.ad.jp> Tue, 12 May 2020 12:27 UTC

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From: Rodney Van Meter <rdv@sfc.wide.ad.jp>
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Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 21:27:34 +0900
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Subject: [Qirg] Attacking the Quantum Internet
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<chair hat off, personal hat on>

New paper from my group, preprint, not yet peer-reviewed:
https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.04617 <https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.04617>
Attacking the Quantum Internet
Takahiko Satoh, Shota Nagayama, Shigeya Suzuki, Takaaki Matsuo, Rodney Van Meter
The main service provided by the coming Quantum Internet will be
creating entanglement between any two quantum nodes. We discuss and
classify attacks on quantum repeaters, which will serve roles similar
to those of classical Internet routers. We have modeled the components
for and structure of quantum repeater network nodes. With this model,
we point out attack vectors, then analyze attacks in terms of
confidentiality, integrity and availability. While we are reassured
about the promises of quantum networks from the confidentiality point
of view, integrity and availability present new vulnerabilities not
present in classical networks and require care to handle properly. We
observe that the requirements on the classical computing/networking
elements affect the systems' overall security risks. This
component-based analysis establishes a framework for further
investigation of network-wide vulnerabilities.

——

Comments *very* welcome!  Not yet submitted to the journal, will be within a week or so.

—Rod

Rodney Van Meter
Professor, Faculty of Environment and Information Studies
Keio University, Japan
rdv@sfc.wide.ad.jp