Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] RESET_STREAM should be allowed in 0-RTT packets (#2344)

Kazuho Oku <> Tue, 22 January 2019 23:42 UTC

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From: Kazuho Oku <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] RESET_STREAM should be allowed in 0-RTT packets (#2344)
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> Because the client here is an attacker. However, I'm not seeing as much threat related to this specific change -- this is something the client can do regardless (generating many connections and causing state to be allocated for each).

The difference between a DoS using 1-RTT packets and 0-RTT packets is that the latter requires far less CPU cost on the attacker-side. This is because an attacker can just retransmit the same packets from different source tuples, whereas in 1-RTT case, an attacker needs to do expensive crypto operations (especially DH) for each connection it establishes.

Therefore my preference goes to limiting the capability of 0-RTT.

I like #2360 (maybe more than the approach I described in, because it clearly limits what a client can do using 0-RTT _for streams_.

The remaining question is what we should do for non-stream-related frames.

I still think that it makes sense to disallow the use of any non-stream-related frame in 0-RTT packets, considering the fact that:
* the frames allowed by 0-RTT and 1-RTT packets are nevertheless going to be different (CRYPTO, ACK)
* in practice there's no reason to send non-stream-related frames in 0-RTT packets
* potential security issues related to replay

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