Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] use a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame to drive the handshake to confirmation (#3145)

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

martinthomson commented on this pull request.



> @@ -760,14 +756,12 @@ and ignoring any outstanding Initial packets.
 
 ### Discarding Handshake Keys
 
-An endpoint MUST NOT discard its handshake keys until the TLS handshake is
-confirmed ({{handshake-confirmed}}).  An endpoint SHOULD discard its handshake
-keys as soon as it has confirmed the handshake.  Most application protocols
-will send data after the handshake, resulting in acknowledgements that allow
-both endpoints to discard their handshake keys promptly.  Endpoints that do
-not have reason to send immediately after completing the handshake MAY send
-ack-eliciting frames, such as PING, which will cause the handshake to be
-confirmed when they are acknowledged.
+An endpoint MUST discard its handshake keys when the TLS handshake is confirmed

> @martinthomson I don't understand your comment? What's the difference between dropping Initial keys and not processing them any more?

I was merely pointing out that the Initial keys transition is different in that continuing to handle Initial packets leaves endpoints exposed to attack longer than is ideal.  An attacker with access to Handshake keys most likely can break the remainder of the connection.

(This isn't completely true, because an attacker might only gain leaf keys and not the secrets from the core of the TLS key schedule, but the point was that access to Handshake keys signifies a much more significant breach.)

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