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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Spoofed retry token attack on IP authentication (#2394)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Fri, 01 February 2019 13:01 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Spoofed retry token attack on IP authentication (#2394)
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Oh, but you can always create a new connection with a spoofed IP, you don't even need a Retry token.

But that makes me question the entire point of
https://quicwg.org/base-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-transport.html#rfc.section.8.1.1

> As long as it is not possible for an attacker to generate a valid token for its own address (see Section 8.1.3) and the client is able to return that token, it proves to the server that it received the token.

But an attacker does not need to forge a token, it can just pretend to have another IP that it can listen in on. The server will then voluntarily provide the token.

I suppose this requires a v2 authenticated handshake.

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