Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)

Eric Kinnear <notifications@github.com> Wed, 11 March 2020 17:35 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7255B3A0EFC for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:35:01 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.696
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.696 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id r3FoTX1rPx05 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:35:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from out-20.smtp.github.com (out-20.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.203]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EED8F3A0EF7 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:34:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from github-lowworker-2e54e43.va3-iad.github.net (github-lowworker-2e54e43.va3-iad.github.net [10.48.17.27]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC7EC8C07DD for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:34:58 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1583948098; bh=e8LzppiKZENYotRxQy5FCvu3Np1d7HSfLZwNtRsnlqk=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=zpHm9WC1p0UYWGSu/KS5DttkTyMP3EUy3Ac7oJg4kKpyuNVadS5AuJIVLuAtU7oyj th3tgAx2LQlTh5hvUNPex5zBdOzfbbUgK45Zyq0XG8PmR3qn80b75f3thZY56QxWNc 0KvUPmeEJxjIVHQ0iQw7+b6uueRdHlV9uUG6i7Sk=
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 10:34:58 -0700
From: Eric Kinnear <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+AFTOJK4RMETGBFZSUQIC2NF4OUBEFEVBNHHBYGSUE4@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2925/review/372979175@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2925@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2925@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5e692142cb819_2a573fada1ccd95c1401a0"; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: erickinnear
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/12rHNS7nmOUUutXZ0VowPt2dRO8>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 17:35:02 -0000

erickinnear commented on this pull request.



> +Computing the server's first flight for a full handshake is potentially
+expensive, requiring both a signature and a key exchange computation.  In order
+to prevent computational DoS attacks, QUIC incorporates a cheap token exchange
+mechanism which allows servers to validate a client's IP address prior to doing
+any expensive computations at the cost of a single round trip.  After a
+successful handshake, servers can issue new tokens to a client which will allow
+new connection establishment without incurring this cost.
+
+#### On-Path Handshake Termination
+
+An on-path attacker can force the QUIC handshake to fail by replacing either the
+client or server Initial messages with invalid messages.  An off-path attacker
+can also mount this attack by racing the Initials.  Once valid Initial messages
+have been exchanged, the remaining handshake messages are protected with the
+handshake keys and an on-path attacker cannot force handshake failure, though
+they can produce a handshake timeout by dropping packets.

That could be a great thing to cover, can you file an issue to discuss whatever text should be here?

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2925#discussion_r391144964