Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Stateless Reset from clients, bis (#1505)

Igor Lubashev <notifications@github.com> Fri, 29 June 2018 22:32 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Stateless Reset from clients, bis (#1505)
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Ted, take a look at #466 (closer to the end of the thread).

The problem we have right now is that client cannot supply a stateless reset token during handshake, because client's part of the handshake (unlike the server's) is not protected.  So the situation we have right now is that clients _cannot_ send a Stateless Reset any time later, until the server has switched to using a new CID from the client, provided by the client in NEW_CONNECTION_ID.  (And switching CIDs may never happen.)

So the "idea" I am proposing is very simple -- since the client cannot not send its stateless reset token associated with its CID during handshake, let it send that token later (as soon as it starts to send protected packets).

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