Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Authenticating connection IDs (#3439)

[MikkelFJ <[e-mail]>]

I think @huitema makes a lot of good points. However, tying ODCID to retry-CID could make the production DCID longer than is desirable.

Another option might be to have an additional authentication tag (AAT) in the handshake packets that is carried along similar to TP, but not necessarily inside the TP machinery. The server or LB could check the AAT at high DoS load without forcing the CID to be long and it could cover other critical parameters as well.

If the client needs similar assurances it cannot use th AAT directly to do its own checking, but philosophically, the server decides the CIDs going towards the server, and it is the servers responsible to design and check those CIDs with reasonable security bounds for the given deployment. If a server does not check for retry attack CIDs, there are many other things that it might also not check making the connection flawed in some way.

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