Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Define an anti-forgery limit (#3620)

Lucas Pardue <> Thu, 07 May 2020 15:01 UTC

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Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 08:01:09 -0700
From: Lucas Pardue <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Define an anti-forgery limit (#3620)
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@LPardue commented on this pull request.

> +packets can be used to obtain the same confidentiality protection as the limits
+specified in TLS.
+The usage limits defined in TLS 1.3 exist to provide protection against attacks
+on confidentiality and apply to successful applications of AEAD protection. The
+integrity protections in authenticated encryption also depend on limiting the
+number of attempts to forge packets. TLS achieves this by closing connections
+after any record fails an authentication check. In comparison, QUIC ignores any
+packet that cannot be authenticated, allowing multiple attempts at defeating
+integrity protection.
+Endpoints MUST count the number of packets that are received but cannot be
+authenticated. Packet protection keys MUST NOT be used for removing packet
+protection after authentication fails on more than a per-AEAD limit. Endpoints
+MUST initiate a key update before reaching this limit. Applying a limit reduces
+the probability than attacker is able to successfully forge a packet; see

the probability that an attacker is able to successfully forge a packet; see

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