Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Defend against endless Stateless Reset ping-pong (#1627)

ianswett <notifications@github.com> Thu, 02 August 2018 00:29 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8597C130ED3 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 17:29:14 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -8.009
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.009 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FPYWw77tXRnE for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 17:29:13 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from out-4.smtp.github.com (out-4.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.195]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CD226130DF5 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Wed, 1 Aug 2018 17:29:12 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Wed, 01 Aug 2018 17:29:11 -0700
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1533169751; bh=zAVAQDN5MN1P8TyRHQTnrXdfcC1ebWjysNc2WQViDDg=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=TIWgwNtx0MLTTmB2oq1Fw2OQRBBojzPaloPStw93xHoxPDQ6n9ZFr9LYy4dwu2+t6 Ue1x0L+uuY3AHagQn/WWuxFF4Gvhum1Sr4K8Acv3Kjfv6p7FBvWzOen/1Vi6r4hdhe X4AQYwzpzXm/WRsPzs+QGIvTrmFX/7w54yF+9yxs=
From: ianswett <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+0166e4aba1f8062e8831d0e6624dfb3505f6fffbda6f341492cf00000001177a125792a169ce14a6c47a@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/1627/review/142609921@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/1627@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/1627@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Defend against endless Stateless Reset ping-pong (#1627)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5b625057e5cc1_35053fdacc0d45bc2045f5"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: ianswett
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/51EGUJMOeIhrx1pp5hcEPI-v8DA>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.27
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2018 00:29:15 -0000

ianswett commented on this pull request.



> +#### Looping {#reset-looping}
+
+The design of a Stateless Reset is such that it is indistinguishable from a
+valid packet.  This means that a Stateless Reset might trigger the sending of a
+Stateless Reset in response, which could lead to infinite exchanges.  An
+endpoint MUST use any one of the following measures to limit the sending of
+Stateless Reset:
+
+* An endpoint can remember the number of Stateless Reset packets that it has
+  sent and stop generating new Stateless Reset packets once a limit is reached.
+  Using separate limits for different remote addresses - or different values for
+  the Destination Connection ID fields on the packet that triggers the reset -
+  will ensure that Stateless Reset packets can be used to close connections when
+  other peers or connections have exhausted limits.
+
+* An endpoint can ensure that every Stateless Reset that it sends is smaller

I think it's worth advising that a stateless reset should never be larger than the received packet.  This makes this defense unilaterally useful, because at least one side is reducing the size every time.

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/1627#pullrequestreview-142609921