Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Restore other state after a spoofed migration (#3229)

ianswett <> Tue, 12 November 2019 21:32 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3229120127 for <>; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:32:50 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.596
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.596 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key)
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id afV4-UArWsuK for <>; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:32:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ( []) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 12D871200EB for <>; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:32:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 85C49120280 for <>; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:32:48 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;; s=pf2014; t=1573594368; bh=NSDzdFzAUlYxYUkGrtQqEYJb/UzPpiREN/DA9xk7bf4=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=RgqUWJPlUILeMREK0IHeTLXO7OMsOlZtasnwMW4B9xrR1vwlxu2K7KTDxJ8mco8or L4RfHiLbFN8ZGfrYgOK3yE79BdajqIAQl4tmIbPzsWMqzwLSDPViIioEWNxaOfzjL0 Zym3NutCkmkn2RY92TQTPV2WlkNMVxtQvxKDTAJE=
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:32:48 -0800
From: ianswett <>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <>
Cc: Subscribed <>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3229/review/>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Restore other state after a spoofed migration (#3229)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5dcb2500411f1_7a33ff134acd9641455315"; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: ianswett
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
Archived-At: <>
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 21:32:51 -0000

ianswett commented on this pull request.

> @@ -1979,7 +1979,10 @@ to verify the peer's ownership of the unvalidated address.
 An endpoint MAY send data to an unvalidated peer address, but it MUST protect
 against potential attacks as described in {{address-spoofing}} and
 {{on-path-spoofing}}.  An endpoint MAY skip validation of a peer address if that
-address has been seen recently.
+address has been seen recently.  In particular, if an endpoint returns to a
+previously-validated path after detecting some form of spurious migration,
+skipping address validation and restoring loss detection and congestion state
+can reduce the performance impact of the attack.

The way I think about this is that the old address validation and congestion state are maintained until the new address is validated.  ie: In my thinking, the responder never left the original path.

You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: