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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Client's initial destination CID is unauthenticated (#1486)

Igor Lubashev <notifications@github.com> Tue, 10 July 2018 04:43 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Client's initial destination CID is unauthenticated (#1486)
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> That means an on-path attacker could decrypt, modify bytes, and re-encrypt.

Ok, but if you make initial secret (or ODCID) a part of AD for 1-rtt encryption, you could ensure that while the tampering would allow the handshake to succeed, it would but not allow transmission past the handshake.

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