Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Need to prevent amplification attack for any case where the server's response is big (#1309)

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

OK, as discussed on #1616:

If there is no valid token we already have text that says that you can't send more than 3 datagrams.  That covers 0-RTT as well has the handshake.  If there is a valid token, limiting the amount of data sent to a valid peer is a job for a congestion controller.  In this case, the initial congestion window is sufficient (or, as ekr put it: YOLO).

With recommended settings, that moves from 3 packets to 10, which isn't a big enough increase to be problematic, especially considering the amount of processing involved in accepting and responding to 0-RTT.  Servers won't want to do that without a reasonable assurance that the data is wanted, so the amplification attack surface is reduced.

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