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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] token-based greasing / initial packet protection (#3166)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Wed, 30 October 2019 07:02 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 00:02:49 -0700
From: MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] token-based greasing / initial packet protection (#3166)
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mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



> @@ -3940,6 +4007,19 @@ described in {{QUIC-TLS}}.  This protection does not provide confidentiality or
 integrity against on-path attackers, but provides some level of protection
 against off-path attackers.
 
+Additionally, the token is accompanied by a checksum.  This is because when a

The checksum is very useful in situations where a bridge forwards a connection over an alternative medium such as USB or Bluetooth. The Retry and VN packets are the only packets that don't have self-integrity checks and such a bridge would be forced to provide additional framing. This framing is tolerable for VN because it is universal, but for Retry it requires version knowledge. It is much simpler if packets can just be forwarded with no knowledge other than length.

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