Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)

Christian Huitema <notifications@github.com> Mon, 26 November 2018 05:25 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)
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huitema commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1059,6 +1083,14 @@ A sender that does not use pacing SHOULD reset its congestion window to the
 minimum of the current congestion window and the initial congestion window.
 This recommendation is based on Section 4.1 of {{?RFC5681}}.
 
+## In-Flight Packet Accounting
+
+When keys for an encryption level are discarded (see {{QUIC-TLS}}), any packets
+sent with those keys are removed from the count of bytes in flight.  No loss
+events will occur for these packets.  Note that it is expected that keys are
+discarded after those packets would be declared lost, but Initial secrets are
+destroyed earlier.

We discussed some of that in the chat room (because we enjoy splitting discussions on many channels with different note well rules). The general idea is that if packets are implicitly acknowledged, then the corresponding bytes are removed from the count of bytes in flight. To quote, "_Implicit ACK should be treated just like regular ACK, but there are 2 small issues -- spurious repeat, and ACK. The handshake can complete with a spurious repeat still in flight, or with a not-yet-received ACK. Still, that cannot be a huge deal._"

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