Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)

[Gorry Fairhurst <[e-mail]>]

gorryfair commented on this pull request.

Comments from Hackathon - basically heading in correct direction.

> +to a new endpoint as part of an established QUIC connection.
+
+
+##### On-Path Active Attacks
+
+An attacker that can cause a packet it observes to no longer reach its intended
+destination is considered an on-path attacker.  Such an attacker generally is
+present between the QUIC client and server, and a QUIC endpoint is required to
+send packets through this attacker to establish connectivity on a given path.
+
+An on-path attacker can:
+
+- Inspect packets
+- Modify IP and UDP packet headers
+- Inject new packets
+- Delay packets

Delay (includes reordering)

> +the original path between endpoints, and therefore the original packets sent by
+an endpoint are still reaching their destination.  This means that a future
+failure to route copied packets to the destination faster than their original
+path will not prevent the original packets from reaching the destination.
+
+A limited on-path attacker can:
+
+- Inspect packets
+- Inject new packets
+- Modify unencrypted packet headers
+
+A limited on-path attacker cannot:
+
+- Delay packets beyond the original packet duration
+- Drop packets
+- Modify encrypted packet payloads

he can - but they don't work

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