Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Immediately close with INVALID_TOKEN (#3107)

Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com> Fri, 01 November 2019 22:16 UTC

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Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2019 15:16:05 -0700
From: Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Immediately close with INVALID_TOKEN (#3107)
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janaiyengar commented on this pull request.

Thanks for the changes, @kazuho's text suggestion answers my question. I have a couple more comments.

> @@ -1641,6 +1641,13 @@ of connection establishment.  By giving the client a different connection ID to
 use, a server can cause the connection to be routed to a server instance with
 more resources available for new connections.
 
+If a server receives a client Initial that can be unprotected but contains an
+invalid Retry token, it knows the client will not accept another Retry token.
+It can either proceed with the handshake without verifying the token or
+immediately close ({{immediate-close}}) the connection with a connection

```suggestion
immediately close ({{immediate-close}}) the connection with an INVALID_TOKEN
```

> @@ -1641,6 +1641,13 @@ of connection establishment.  By giving the client a different connection ID to
 use, a server can cause the connection to be routed to a server instance with
 more resources available for new connections.
 
+If a server receives a client Initial that can be unprotected but contains an
+invalid Retry token, it knows the client will not accept another Retry token.
+It can either proceed with the handshake without verifying the token or
+immediately close ({{immediate-close}}) the connection with a connection
+error of INVALID_TOKEN to cause the handshake to fail quickly instead of

```suggestion
error to cause the handshake to fail quickly instead of
```

> @@ -1641,6 +1641,13 @@ of connection establishment.  By giving the client a different connection ID to
 use, a server can cause the connection to be routed to a server instance with
 more resources available for new connections.
 
+If a server receives a client Initial that can be unprotected but contains an
+invalid Retry token, it knows the client will not accept another Retry token.
+It can either proceed with the handshake without verifying the token or
+immediately close ({{immediate-close}}) the connection with a connection
+error of INVALID_TOKEN to cause the handshake to fail quickly instead of
+waiting for the client to timeout.

This suggests 2 options at the server, when there are 3: it can simply drop the packet and let the client time out. You may want to call out all three options. 

Suggestion: "If a server receives a client Initial that can be unprotected but contains an invalid Retry token, it knows the client will not accept another Retry token. The server can drop such a packet and allow the client to time out to detect loss of this connection, but that is a significant latency penalty to the client. If possible, the server SHOULD either immediately close the connection with an INVALID_TOKEN error or proceed with the handshake without verifying the token."

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