Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow reuse of stateless reset tokens (#2733)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Wed, 22 May 2019 15:45 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow reuse of stateless reset tokens (#2733)
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martinthomson commented on this pull request.



> @@ -2476,6 +2476,14 @@ the same static key (see {{reset-oracle}}).  A connection ID from a connection
 that is reset by revealing the Stateless Reset Token MUST NOT be reused for new
 connections at nodes that share a static key.
 
+The same Stateless Reset Token MAY be used for multiple connection IDs on the
+same connection.  An endpoint that reuses a Stateless Reset Token MUST ensure
+that any connection ID used on the connection is matched to the active
+connection, including any routing performed at load balancers, even when a
+connection ID has been retired.  Otherwise, an attacker might be able to send a
+packet with a retired connection ID and cause the endpoint to produce a
+Stateless Reset.
+
 Note that Stateless Reset packets do not have any cryptographic protection.

That doesn't quite work because it is OK to forget a connection ID if the associated stateless reset token is no longer in use.  Maybe I need to try again.

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