Return-Path: X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7584120175 for ; Fri, 19 Apr 2019 13:17:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -8.001 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bxmJbu4FoMs6 for ; Fri, 19 Apr 2019 13:17:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from out-3.smtp.github.com (out-3.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.194]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DA9761200E6 for ; Fri, 19 Apr 2019 13:17:11 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 13:17:10 -0700 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1555705030; bh=OqPq6kvrBTUXUFlafroan+VTfYTdlZPlTvt2YEfop/Q=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=MpVNtVwotYUhTXicpIptbXrSyTrt1/9AeNF5xqD351gGNwsLzA/s1397690+FuOkd XM2N2zC9ZJWSOVd4W50IzqLz9+t7ezFYmUo6hjH4uLsB9IdvQnJHbdARqic/T3DxQW hUX92E79Kjp+78E+poky/h3am2inuDIlR99FHKME= From: Jana Iyengar Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts To: quicwg/base-drafts Cc: Subscribed Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Targeted attacks in Security Considerations (#2635) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5cba2cc6a3003_b323fd5b9ccd96c107880"; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: list X-GitHub-Sender: janaiyengar X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org Archived-At: X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 20:17:14 -0000 ----==_mimepart_5cba2cc6a3003_b323fd5b9ccd96c107880 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit janaiyengar commented on this pull request. a few nits > @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade attacks. Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets MUST define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks. +## Targeted Attacks by Routing + +Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new connection +to a particular instance. This means that client-controlled fields, such as the ```suggestion to a particular server instance. This means that client-controlled fields, such as the ``` > @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade attacks. Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets MUST define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks. +## Targeted Attacks by Routing + +Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new connection +to a particular instance. This means that client-controlled fields, such as the +initial Destination Connection ID used on Initial and 0-RTT packets SHOULD NOT +be used to make routing decisions. Ideally, routing decisions are made ```suggestion be used by themselves to make routing decisions. Ideally, routing decisions are made ``` > @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade attacks. Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets MUST define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks. +## Targeted Attacks by Routing + +Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new connection +to a particular instance. This means that client-controlled fields, such as the +initial Destination Connection ID used on Initial and 0-RTT packets SHOULD NOT +be used to make routing decisions. Ideally, routing decisions are made +independently of client-selected values; a Source Connection ID can be selected +to route subsequent packets to the same server. ```suggestion to route later packets to the same server. ``` -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2635#pullrequestreview-228813482 ----==_mimepart_5cba2cc6a3003_b323fd5b9ccd96c107880 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

@janaiyengar commented on this pull request.

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a few nits

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In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

=0D 
> @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets=
 do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade=0D
 attacks.  Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets M=
UST=0D
 define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks.=0D
 =0D
+## Targeted Attacks by Routing=0D
+=0D
+Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new conn=
ection=0D
+to a particular instance.  This means that client-controlled fields, suc=
h as the=0D
=0D =E2=AC=87=EF=B8=8F Suggested change=0D 
-to a particular instance.  This means that cl=
ient-controlled fields, such as the=0D
+to a particular server instance.  This means that client-controlled fiel=
ds, such as the=0D
=0D =0D =0D
=0D =0D

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

=0D 
> @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets=
 do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade=0D
 attacks.  Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets M=
UST=0D
 define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks.=0D
 =0D
+## Targeted Attacks by Routing=0D
+=0D
+Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new conn=
ection=0D
+to a particular instance.  This means that client-controlled fields, suc=
h as the=0D
+initial Destination Connection ID used on Initial and 0-RTT packets SHOU=
LD NOT=0D
+be used to make routing decisions.  Ideally, routing decisions are made=0D=
=0D =E2=AC=87=EF=B8=8F Suggested change=0D 
-be used to make routing decisions.  Ideally, =
routing decisions are made=0D
+be used by themselves to make routing decisions.  Ideally, routing decis=
ions are made=0D
=0D =0D =0D
=0D =0D

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

=0D 
> @@ -5382,6 +5382,14 @@ Negotiation packets=
 do not contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade=0D
 attacks.  Future versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets M=
UST=0D
 define a mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks.=0D
 =0D
+## Targeted Attacks by Routing=0D
+=0D
+Deployments should limit the ability of an attacker to target a new conn=
ection=0D
+to a particular instance.  This means that client-controlled fields, suc=
h as the=0D
+initial Destination Connection ID used on Initial and 0-RTT packets SHOU=
LD NOT=0D
+be used to make routing decisions.  Ideally, routing decisions are made=0D=

+independently of client-selected values; a Source Connection ID can be s=
elected=0D
+to route subsequent packets to the same server.=0D
=0D =E2=AC=87=EF=B8=8F Suggested change=0D 
-to route subsequent packets to the same serve=
r.=0D
+to route later packets to the same server.=0D
=0D =0D =0D

&m= dash;
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thre= ad.
Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub, or mute the thread.3D""

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