Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Padding overhead in DNS over QUIC scenarios (#3523)

Nick Banks <> Tue, 17 March 2020 23:10 UTC

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Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 16:10:03 -0700
From: Nick Banks <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Padding overhead in DNS over QUIC scenarios (#3523)
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FYI, for MsQuic it would be difficult to make kind of decision based on an extension (TP). This logic happens statelessly, without processing the payload of the packet. If we had to change the logic to possibly always accept the packet far enough into the recv pipeline to look for a TP, that would be a really big change. What if the TP isn't in the first packet of the client initial (multi-client-initial)? Now the attacker can send an even smaller packet to make me (the server) hold state, while I wait for a TP that might not come to decide if that first packet was big enough?

Making a new version would be the only reasonable solution, IMO.

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