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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] TLS MUST NOT deliver server 1RTT Rx keys until getting Finished (#3173)

martinduke <notifications@github.com> Thu, 31 October 2019 05:44 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 22:44:08 -0700
From: martinduke <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] TLS MUST NOT deliver server 1RTT Rx keys until getting Finished (#3173)
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I'm not sure of the rules here, but this requirement is on the
QUIC-specific interfaces. People already have to modify TLS to comply with
quic-tls.

On Wed, Oct 30, 2019, 10:32 PM Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> wrote:

> I think it's worth noting this, though I tend to agree with @martinthomson
> <https://github.com/martinthomson> that we cannot write this down using
> an normative language because that is a requirement of TLS.
>
> That said, I actually wonder if we can have a section discussing
> Implementation Pitfalls. TLS 1.3 has an appendix dedicated to that (see RFC
> 8446, Appendix C <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#appendix-C%5D>),
> and it has been extremely helpful to me. I think it would be nice to have
> something like that in the QUIC drafts.
>
> —
> You are receiving this because you authored the thread.
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