Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Immediately close with INVALID_TOKEN (#3107)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Tue, 22 October 2019 02:27 UTC

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Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 19:27:01 -0700
From: Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Immediately close with INVALID_TOKEN (#3107)
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kazuho commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1641,6 +1641,14 @@ of connection establishment.  By giving the client a different connection ID to
 use, a server can cause the connection to be routed to a server instance with
 more resources available for new connections.
 
+If a server receives a client Initial with a unverifiable Retry token,
+it knows the client will not accept another Retry token.  It can either
+proceed with the handshake without verifying the token or immediately close

If we are to make this a mandatory requirement, under the assumption that the servers would act like that, should we also suggest that a server should issue tokens in a way that a Retry token and a NEW_TOKEN token are distinguishable from each other?

Unless we recommend servers building a token in that way, I do not think making this a MUST has benefits.

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