Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Authenticate connection IDs (#3499)

Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com> Thu, 09 April 2020 01:11 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CA2CB3A1C63 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 18:11:42 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.267
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.267 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.168, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id NSjNZ_gVVq8z for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 18:11:40 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from out-10.smtp.github.com (out-10.smtp.github.com [192.30.254.193]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D42083A1C61 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 18:11:40 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Wed, 08 Apr 2020 18:11:40 -0700
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1586394700; bh=RHKb02MAYyjcSEvGI5wLSO6USEwoB3WcVYUnQLRxoFA=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=i5EAbZnr/ADwg/nJZrjdr/A6HYfzG9/kEo7ovic0iJLSMkzQlwxNzLJSD995/cvGn +8piGeS5/V85c6T2pH/vgL0LY5JaYlxHeHO7PTOoM5EMX0eLwlDqzaythwNKPmZmMv IOyYhACwWp1vivR9kNmFJyD6EbNA4VwU17HEHtrw=
From: Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+AFTOJK7DVL3K6UDDFTB6SOF4TJLUZEVBNHHCESD76A@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3499/review/390408658@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3499@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3499@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Authenticate connection IDs (#3499)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5e8e764c3ea37_3a143ff7644cd95c20540"; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: janaiyengar
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/DprPQu1xiJaDWQOJL9R7rFnLGNY>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 09 Apr 2020 01:11:43 -0000

@janaiyengar requested changes on this pull request.

A few comments. Most importantly, mention of ODCID field needs to be removed.

> +{{transport-parameters}}. This ensures that all connection IDs are authenticated
+by the cryptographic handshake.

```suggestion
{{transport-parameters}}. This ensures that all connection IDs used for the
handshake are also authenticated by the cryptographic handshake.
```

> +(original_connection_id, preferred_address, retry_connection_id, and
+stateless_reset_token). A server MUST treat receipt of any of these transport

```suggestion
original_connection_id, preferred_address, retry_connection_id, or
stateless_reset_token. A server MUST treat receipt of any of these transport
```

> @@ -4794,9 +4854,9 @@ immediately after opening.  If the transport parameter is absent, streams of
 that type start with a flow control limit of 0.
 
 A client MUST NOT include server-only transport parameters

```suggestion
A client MUST NOT include any server-only transport parameter:
```

> @@ -1475,6 +1475,49 @@ lifetime of a connection, especially in response to connection migration
 ({{migration}}); see {{issue-cid}} for details.
 
 
+## Authenticating Connection IDs {#cid-auth}
+
+The choice each endpoint makes about connection IDs during the handshake is
+authenticated by including all values in transport parameters; see
+{{transport-parameters}}. This ensures that all connection IDs are authenticated
+by the cryptographic handshake.
+
+Each endpoint includes the value of the Source Connection ID field from Initial
+packets it sends in the handshake_connection_id transport parameter; see
+{{transport-parameter-definitions}}. A server includes the Destination
+Connection ID field it receives in the original Initial packet from the client

```suggestion
Connection ID field it receives in original Initial packets from the client
- Initial packets received by the server prior to sending a Retry packet -
```

> +Each endpoint ensures that the values of the peer's transport parameters
+match the values the endpoint sent in its packet headers. The values

```suggestion
The values
```
This first sentence is unnecessary.

> +values that an endpoint used in the Destination Connection ID field of an
+Initial packet. Including connection ID values in transport parameters and

```suggestion
values that an endpoint used in the Destination Connection ID field of Initial
packets that it sent. Including connection ID values in transport parameters and
```

> +verifying them ensures that the choice of connection ID cannot be influenced by
+an attacker. An endpoint MUST treat any of the following as a connection error
+of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION:

```suggestion
verifying them ensures that that an attacker cannot influence the choice of
connection ID for a successful connection by injecting packets carrying
attacker-chosen connection IDs during the handshake. An endpoint MUST
treat any of the following as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION:
```

> +{{transport-parameter-definitions}}.  If the server sends a Retry packet, the
+server adds a retry_connection_id transport parameter that contains the value of
+the Source Connection ID field from the Retry packet.

```suggestion
{{transport-parameter-definitions}}.  If it sends a Retry packet, the server
also subsequently includes the value of the Source Connection ID field from
the Retry packet in its retry_connection_id transport parameter.
```

> +A server always includes an original_connection_id transport parameter. If the
+server sends a Retry packet, it MUST include the Destination Connection ID field
+from the client's first Initial packet in the original_connection_id transport
+parameter; otherwise the original_connection_id transport parameter MUST be
+copied from the client Initial.

```suggestion
A server always includes an original_connection_id transport parameter. If it
sends a Retry packet, the server MUST subsequently include the Destination
Connection ID field from the client's original Initial packets - packets received
by the server prior to sending the Retry packet -  in the original_connection_id
transport parameter. If the server did not send a Retry packet, the value of the
original_connection_id transport parameter MUST be copied from the
Destination Connection ID field of the most recent client Initial packets.
```

> +  by a server.  This is the same value sent in the Original Destination
+  Connection ID field that is used to construct a Retry packet (see
+  {{packet-retry}}).

```suggestion
  by a server.  The value of this parameter depends on whether the server
  sent a Retry packet (see {{packet-retry}}).
```

> @@ -1475,6 +1475,48 @@ lifetime of a connection, especially in response to connection migration
 ({{migration}}); see {{issue-cid}} for details.
 
 
+## Authenticating Connection IDs {#cid-auth}
+
+The choice each endpoint makes about connection IDs during the handshake is
+authenticated by including all values in transport parameters; see
+{{transport-parameters}}. This ensures that all connection IDs are authenticated
+by the cryptographic handshake.
+
+Each endpoint includes the value of the Source Connection ID field from Initial
+packets it sends in the handshake_connection_id transport parameter; see

In keeping with retry_connection_id being the SCID that is used on Retry packets, I have a preference for initial_connection_id, since it is the SCID used on Initial packets. 

In the same vein, and this is a weaker preference, I would propose changing original_connection_id to original_initial_connection_id. I think this makes it clear that this might have been initial_connection_id had it not been for a Retry.

> +Each endpoint includes the value of the Source Connection ID field from Initial
+packets it sends in the handshake_connection_id transport parameter; see

```suggestion
Each endpoint includes the value of the Source Connection ID field from the 
most recent Initial packet it sent in the handshake_connection_id transport
parameter; see
```

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3499#pullrequestreview-390408658