Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Minor TLS draft editorial corrections (#2446)

martinduke <notifications@github.com> Mon, 11 February 2019 04:26 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Minor TLS draft editorial corrections (#2446)
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martinduke commented on this pull request.



>                       1-RTT --------------->
                                               Handshake Received
                                           Rekey rx to 1-RTT keys
-                                                   Get Handshake

 I would have said no, except for the bit about the NST. I might file another PR about that. The kind of ugly thing about this diagram is rekeying the rx from 0RTT to Handshake. There's no actual trigger for this; in practice we're actually keeping both keys, of course.

> @@ -216,10 +216,12 @@ Note that this omits the EndOfEarlyData message, which is not used in QUIC (see
 
 Data is protected using a number of encryption levels:
 
-- Plaintext
-- Early Data (0-RTT) Keys
-- Handshake Keys
-- Application Data (1-RTT) Keys
+- Initial Keys can be derived by any observer, and so they do not
+  provide cryptographic protection or authentication.
+- Early Data (0-RTT) Keys. These keys are not forward-secure and must protect
+  only idempotent data.
+- Handshake Keys do not authenticate either endpoint.
+- Application Data (1-RTT) Keys provide full authentication and encryption.
 

OK, this is going away, except for s/Plaintext/Initial

> @@ -269,7 +271,7 @@ At a high level, there are two main interactions between the TLS and QUIC
 components:
 
 * The TLS component sends and receives messages via the QUIC component, with
-  QUIC providing a reliable stream abstraction to TLS.
+  QUIC providing a reliable stream and record abstraction to TLS.
 

It's not the separate spaces, it's the crypto frame itself. We're stripping out the TLS record layer and replacing it with the frame. I'm not sure how you can compare the figures at the start of Sections 2 and 3 and come to a different conclusion.

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