[quicwg/base-drafts] Remove handshake confirmed test for KeyUpdte (#3212)

ekr <notifications@github.com> Sun, 10 November 2019 22:41 UTC

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Date: Sun, 10 Nov 2019 14:41:05 -0800
From: ekr <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: [quicwg/base-drafts] Remove handshake confirmed test for KeyUpdte (#3212)
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S 6.1 Says

   An endpoint MUST NOT initiate a key update prior to having confirmed
   the handshake (Section 4.1.2).  An endpoint MUST NOT initiate a
   subsequent key update prior unless it has received an acknowledgment
   for a packet that was sent protected with keys from the current key
   phase.

However, I believe that the requirement to have confirmed the
handshake is redundant. As a reminder, the conditions under which the
handshake is confirmed are:

   (1) the handshake is complete, and
   (2) the endpoint has received an acknowledgment for a
       packet sent with 1-RTT keys

1. On the client side, the 1-RTT keys aren't available until the handshake
   is complete, so it's not possible to send 1-RTT packet and therefore
   not possible to have them ACKed.

2. On the server side, the 1-RTT keys are available before the handshake
   is complete, but because the server is forbidden from reading any
   1-RTT data before processing CFIN (S 5.6), it *also* cannot have
   received an acknowledgement for a packet sent with 1-RTT keys.

In other words, condition (2) implies condition (1), no?


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