Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Write down spoofed packet guarantees (#1347)

[Mike Bishop <[e-mail]>]

MikeBishop approved this pull request.

LGTM.

> +recipient saw a preceding packet from its peer.
+
+The first mechanism used is the source and destination connection IDs, which are
+required to match those set by a peer.  Except for an Initial and stateless
+reset packets, an endpoint only accepts packets that include a destination
+connection that matches a connection ID the endpoint previously chose.  This is
+the only protection offered for Version Negotiation packets.
+
+The destination connection ID in an Initial packet is selected by a client to be
+unpredictable, which serves an additional purpose.  The packets that carry the
+cryptographic handshake are protected with a key that is derived from this
+connection ID and salt specific to the QUIC version.  This allows endpoints to
+use the same process for authenticating packets that they receive as they use
+after the cryptographic handshake completes.  Packets that cannot be
+authenticated are discarded.  Protecting packets in this fashion provides a
+strong assurance that the sender of the packet saw the Initial packets and

packets plural?

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