Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Mandate the use of short header for stateless reset (#2600)

ianswett <notifications@github.com> Wed, 10 April 2019 01:03 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Mandate the use of short header for stateless reset (#2600)
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ianswett commented on this pull request.

The normative text LG, some editorial comments

>  An endpoint MAY send a stateless reset in response to a packet with a long
-header.  This would not be effective if the stateless reset token was not yet
-available to a peer.  In this QUIC version, packets with a long header are only
-used during connection establishment.   Because the stateless reset token is not
-available until connection establishment is complete or near completion,
-ignoring an unknown packet with a long header might be more effective.
+header.  Sending a stateless reset is not effective prior to the stateless reset
+token being available to a peer.  In this QUIC version, packets with a long
+header are only used during connection establishment.   Because the stateless
+reset token is not available until connection establishment is complete or near

nit: is it complete or near complete?  Is the stateless reset token available at handshake completion or near completion(ie: upon receipt of the server's Initial)

>  An endpoint MAY send a stateless reset in response to a packet with a long
-header.  This would not be effective if the stateless reset token was not yet
-available to a peer.  In this QUIC version, packets with a long header are only
-used during connection establishment.   Because the stateless reset token is not
-available until connection establishment is complete or near completion,
-ignoring an unknown packet with a long header might be more effective.
+header.  Sending a stateless reset is not effective prior to the stateless reset
+token being available to a peer.  In this QUIC version, packets with a long
+header are only used during connection establishment.   Because the stateless
+reset token is not available until connection establishment is complete or near
+completion, ignoring an unknown packet with a long header might be more
+effective than sending a stateless reset.

equally effective?  I'm unclear about how it could be more effective?  Or maybe reword this last sentence?

> @@ -2391,13 +2391,17 @@ the packet other than the last 16 bytes for carrying data.
 
 ### Detecting a Stateless Reset
 
-An endpoint detects a potential stateless reset when a incoming packet
-with a short header either cannot be associated with a connection,
-cannot be decrypted, or is marked as a duplicate packet.  The endpoint
-then compares the last 16 bytes of the packet with the Stateless Reset
-Token provided by its peer, either in a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame or
-the server's transport parameters.  If these values are identical,
-the endpoint MUST enter the draining period and not send any further
+An endpoint detects a potential stateless reset when an incoming packet either
+cannot be associated with a connection, cannot be decrypted, or is marked as a
+duplicate packet.  The endpoint MUST then compare the last 16 bytes of the
+packet with all Stateless Reset Tokens that are associated with connection IDs
+that are currently in use.  This includes Stateless Reset Tokens from

Should there be any constraint on the receiving IP and port opposed to all possible connections?

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